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This dissertation furthers our understanding of the influence of identity on behavior using 
experimental methods. My first project investigates the influence of social norms on behavior by 
testing for the presence of a gender gap in competitive preferences across two populations that 
vary in culture. Using a laboratory experiment in which subjects select among a competitive and 
non-competitive payment scheme, we find a stark contrast across the two populations with one 
exhibiting the previously found gender gap in competitive preferences while the other exhibits no 
such gap. Our results suggest that nurture in the form of social norms may explain the persistence 
of the gender disparity in labor market outcomes rather than nature.  
My second project looks at group behavior more generally by studying the mechanism 
underlying in-group bias in trust. Using a laboratory experiment that separately identifies the ways 
in which the decision to trust differs from a similarly risky decision, we study how individuals’ 
willingness to trust depends on the identity of their counterpart. We find that individuals exhibit 
little to no preference over relative earnings whether the subject’s counterpart is a member of their 
group or another group. On the other hand, individuals are significantly less likely to take a risk 
when its outcome is determined by a member of another group as opposed to a member of their 
own group. Our results imply that the in-group bias in trust is the result of differences in the 
perceived emotional cost of betrayal rather than altruistic preferences towards the in-group. 
My final project returns to studying gender norms but does so in the context of social 
interaction. We study the strength of gender norms in low promotability task allocation and 
completion through the introduction of heterogeneous costs into a laboratory setting. We find that 





studies, but that the gap among low cost individuals is smaller. In an additional treatment, we find 
that when managers who request another participant to complete the task are introduced that the 
inclusion of explicit cost differences crowds out the previously found gender bias. Taken together, 
our results suggest that gender beliefs play a large role in the gender disparity in low promotability 
task allocation but that making managers aware of opportunity cost differences among their 
employees may alleviate this trend.  
My three projects illustrate that identity is influential in the development of individual 
preferences. Individuals recognize and conform to the behavioral prescriptions of the groups to 
which they belong leading to large differences in behavior between and across groups. My results 
suggest that a deeper understanding of the influence of norms and identity-based behavioral 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is comprised of three projects which study the influence of identity on 
behavior. Within this work, an identity is defined as the recognition of membership to a social 
group by an individual as well as others. Although standard utility theory would suggest that 
rational individuals would ignore such considerations, Akerloff and Kranton’s (2000) theoretical 
work and research across disciplines has indicated this is not the case. The work that comprises 
this dissertation contributes to our understanding of identity through investigating identity-based 
social interaction and the importance of group-specific norms in the development of preferences 
and their resulting behavior.  
The first project (section 2) studies the role of norms in the formation of economic disparity 
across groups. In particular, we look at how differences in gender norms may explain the 
persistence of the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find a 
significant gender gap in competitive preferences and argue that this difference may explain the 
significant gender gap in choice of occupation. However, it is unclear what causes the observed 
gender gap in competitive preferences. We join others in seeking to understand what may explain 
this difference in preferences. 
To do so, we study two populations that differ in culture to examine the effect of social 
norms on the expression of competitive preferences. We replicate the procedures of Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) in which subjects complete a mathematics task under a competitive and non-
competitive payment scheme before they are asked to select which payment scheme they would 
like to apply to an additional performance. We repeat this procedure with Black and Hispanic 
subjects who come from populations that differ in their gender norms to measure the effect of 






We find a gap that is almost identical to the original study in the Hispanic sample but no 
gender gap in competitive preferences in the black population. After ruling out a variety of 
alternative explanations, we are left to conclude that these populations differ in a way that 
significantly effects the expression of competitive preferences. This suggests that nurture plays an 
important role in the previously observed gender gap in competitive preferences and that policies 
may effectively reduce the gap. Beyond this, our work suggests the importance and value of 
considering the multiple dimensions of identity in understanding preferences in behavior. In 
particular, we find that one identity can moderate the effect of another identity on behavior.  
Although this work is focused on the influence of identity on individual behavior, the second 
project (section 3) studies the effect of general group membership on social behavior. 
Trust is an essential building block of economic activity and previous work has shown that 
individuals are biased towards interacting with members of their own group. Although there is an 
evolutionary argument for the existence of in-group bias, its existence in modernity often leads to 
inefficient behavior and in extreme cases, costly conflict. Previous research shows that in-group 
bias in trust exists (Falk and Zehnder, 2013), but it is unclear what drives this tendency. We 
contribute to this work by conducting a laboratory experiment using real randomly assigned 
identity to study the mechanism underlying in-group bias in trust. 
  To do so, we adapt the design first introduced by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) which 
compares the decision to trust to a similarly risky decision. In the original experiment, subjects 
experience one of three treatments which vary the presence of a second individual who earnings 
depend on the decision of another and whether the outcome of a taking a risk is determined by 
another individual or nature. We adapt this design by introducing the within-subjects factor of 






subjects express their desire to take a gamble when it also effects a member of their in-group or 
their out-group and the desire to trust when the outcome is determined by an in-group or an out-
group member. 
We find that subjects exhibit no significant preferences over relative earnings whether their 
partner is a member of their group or another group. On the other hand, we find that in-group bias 
in trust is the result of differences in the perceived emotional cost of betrayal (not having trust 
reciprocated by another individual). Subjects are significantly less willing to trust when the 
decision to trust entails a potential lack of reciprocity from a member of their out-group. We 
hypothesize that this is either because the desire to conform to group ideals by trusting the in-group 
outweighs the emotional cost of betrayal or that what constitutes a betrayal differs for in-group 
and out-group individuals.  Our results shed light on the mechanism underlying in-group bias in 
trust providing greater insight into how to encourage positive intergroup interaction. In the final 
project (section 4), I revisit social interaction, but instead of studying general group norms, I return 
to studying the effects of group specific norms in a social setting. 
Furthering our understanding of the persistence of the gender disparity in labor market 
outcomes, Babcock et al. (2017) investigate the existence of a gender gap in low promotability 
task completion. Using empirical and laboratory data, the authors find that women are more likely 
to be asked and to complete tasks with low promotability. We expand this work by investigating 
the importance of gender norms in this context by introducing explicit cost differences in 
volunteering.   
To test the strength of gender norms in low promotability task completion, we repeat the 
experimental procedures of Babcock et al. (2017) with the addition of heterogeneous costs of 






or not to pay a cost so the entire group is better off. Similar to the real-world incentives present in 
a low promotability task, subjects desire the benefit but prefer not to be the one to pay the cost. 
We find that the introduction of explicit cost differences into this context is more salient for men. 
The result is that the overall gender gap is similar but among low cost individuals is smaller than 
the original study while the opposite is true of high cost individuals. However, when managers are 
introduced, the gender gap is eliminated by managers making requests equally across genders. 
Although costs were ineffective in reducing the gap in volunteering, it did eliminate the gender 
gap in requests received to volunteer. Our results suggest that providing mangers with information 
regarding the opportunity costs of their employees may alleviate the empirically observed gender 
gap in low promotability task completion. 
Together, my results suggest that social norms can have subtle yet powerful effects on 
individual behavior that can create large disparities in economic outcomes. Beyond individual 
behavior, my results illustrate that identity impacts how individuals interact with others leading to 
loss of economic inefficiency. In sum, my work illustrates that identity is a influential force that 













2. GENDER, CULTURE, AND COMPETITION 
2.1 Introduction 
 Although women have gained equality in some important areas, the gender gap in wages 
and upward mobility within firms have lagged. Women earn 80% of what a male in the same 
position earns on average and only 19 of the Fortune 500 companies have female Chief Executive 
Officers (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Historical explanations for the observed gender gap cite 
differences in ability and discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Polachek, 1981; Goldin and Rouse, 2000). 
Although these explanations may account for a small portion of the remaining gap, it is unlikely 
that either can fully account for its persistence.  
In a recent review, Blau and Kahn (2017) claim that 60 percent of the gender gap in wages 
is due to differences in occupational choice. Occupational choice, in turn, is strongly correlated 
with competitive preferences (Buser et al. 2014; Buser et al. 2017).  This suggests that an 
alternative explanation for the observed gap is gender differences in competitive preferences. 
Women only represent 30% of degree holders in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) fields, generally viewed as competitive majors, even though women now 
account for more than half of all college degree holders (Noonan, 2017).  If firms award top 
positions competitively, then women’s lower entry into competitive environments may explain the 
lack of female representation among top earning positions.  
Testing this hypothesis in the lab, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that men opt for a 
competitive pay scheme for performing a simple task twice as often as their female counterparts 
even though there are no differences in performance. Although a number of researchers have 
replicated this result in a number of settings using a variety of tasks (Niederle, 2015), the question 






Baron-Cohen and Benenson (2003) argue that the disparity in representation among the 
sciences results from the fact that men are innately better competitors. In favor of this argument, 
some researchers have found biological traits predict competitive preferences (Wozniak et al. 
2014; Buser 2012; Hoffman and Gneezy, 2010). However, researchers have identified 
environments within which there exists no gap in competitive preferences (Booth and Nolen, 2010; 
Almås et al, 2015; Gneezy et al, 2009; Cassar et al. 2016). This suggests that biology alone cannot 
explain the gender gap observed in other populations.  To understand nurture’s role, researchers 
must investigate natural variation in women’s experiences.1   
Apart from biology, cultural norms may also play a significant role in shaping gender 
differences in competitiveness.  Most studies exploring cultural correlates of competitiveness and 
risk-taking compare behavior of subjects across countries to show that the gender gap is not always 
present (Gneezy et al., 2009; Anderson et al. 2013; Cárdenas et al. 2012). Instead, we take 
advantage of cultural variation within the US by examining the competitiveness of black and 
Hispanic university students.  We replicate the procedures of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and 
find robust evidence that culture plays a role in the formation of competitive preferences. Hispanic 
students exhibit a gap in preferences almost identical to the original paper while no such gap occurs 
in our black sample. Differences in ability cannot explain our results, as we detect no gender 
difference within either sample. Confidence and risk aversion explain a portion of the gap but 
neither can fully explain our results. Instead, using rich survey data, we find that differences in 
culture among the two samples predict our pattern of results. Our results add to the debate on 
whether nature or nurture explains the gender gap in competitive preferences by providing 
                                                 
1 Ball et al. 2010 show that, physical prowess is correlated with risk-taking, a related trait to competitiveness.  Their 
work also shows that others’ perceptions of risk tolerance exaggerate the underlying differences related to the 
appearance of strength.  This suggests that stereotypes about risk taking or competitiveness may lead people to 






evidence that nurture drives at least part of the observed gap. Similarly, our findings suggest 
policies that seek to reduce the gender gap in competitive preferences should consider the 
importance of shifting social norms.   
In a broader sense, our paper comments on the importance of subject pool differences in 
evaluating the external validity of experimental results. Previous work on experimental 
methodology has highlighted the importance of subject characteristics but tends to focus on 
concerns regarding using students who are convenient but may not adequately represent the 
population (Abbink and Rockenbach, 2006; List, 2003). For similar reasons, the majority of 
experiments are run using subject pools that are predominantly Caucasian; our work highlights 
that some results using such subjects may not generalize to other cultures. Rather than a problem, 
we see this observation as an opportunity. Our work highlights the importance of multiple 
identities interacting and moderating the effect of group specific norms.  Although there is 
substantial heterogeneity in preferences across populations, it is difficult to identify the root of 
these differences as preferences form endogenously over lengthy periods. Our work illuminates 
the value of harnessing cultural variation to deepen our understanding of the interaction of multiple 
identities and its effect on preferences and their resulting behavior.  
2.2 Literature Review 
Our work enriches an existing literature focused on understanding the persistence of the 
gender gap in earnings and promotion.  Historically, researchers have argued for the importance 
of statistical discrimination driven by beliefs that men are innately better suited for certain tasks 
or that women are more likely to leave their job to raise a family (Arrow, 1973; Polachek, 1981). 
Looking at a separate aspect of discrimination, Goldin and Rouse (2000) find that introducing 






based discrimination. Instead, we join others in investigating behavioral explanations for the 
observed gender gap in promotion and wages. Examples of gender differences in behavior include 
that women are less likely to negotiate for higher salaries (Babcock and Laschever, 2009) and are 
more likely to complete low promotability tasks (Babcock et al., 2017). These differences provide 
an alternative explanation for the persistence of the gender gap even in the presence of greater 
overall gender equality.   
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) investigate an alternative behavioral explanation in the 
form of competitive preferences. In their design, participants first complete an addition task under 
a piece rate payment scheme in which payment is received independent of the performance of 
others. In a second task, participants complete the same addition task under a competitive payment 
scheme in which they are only paid if they are the top performer in a group of four participants.  
After experiencing both payment schemes, participants select which payment scheme they would 
prefer to be applied to a third performance. Although women perform equally well as men, male 
participants were close to twice as likely to pick the competitive pay scheme in the third task. 
Overconfidence among males drives part of these results, but differences in beliefs alone cannot 
fully explain the large gap in competition entry. The authors suggest that the difference in 
competitive preferences explains the lack of female representation among top earning positions.  
Others have replicated this result across various tasks including mazes (Booth and Nolen, 
2012), word search (Cárdenas et al. 2012), and ball throwing (Gneezy et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 
2013). Similarly, the gender gap in competitive preferences has been found in a wide range of 
environments including field settings ranging from tribes generally outside the developed world 
(Gneezy et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 2013) to school children of various ages and in different 






In a follow-up paper, Niederle et al. (2013) find that introducing an affirmative action 
policy that guarantees a winning position to a member of each gender closes the gap in competitive 
preferences at little cost to efficiency. Others find that introducing a team component to 
competition (Healy and Pate, 2011; Dargnies 2012) or simply providing feedback (Wozniak et al., 
2014; Ertac and Szentes, 2011) can shrink the gender gap in competitive preferences. Taken 
together, this research suggests that carefully designed institutions can shrink the existing gap in 
competitive preferences.  
Instead, we join others in seeking to understand the mechanism behind the gender gap in 
competitive preferences. Some researchers suggest men are more competitive due to the pressures 
of reproductive success: men who compete successfully are more likely to attract a high quality 
mate (Daly and Wilson, 1983), an argument that favors nature as the root of the competition gap 
and the notion that men are innately better at competition (Baron-Cohen and Benenson, 2003). 
However, Akerloff and Kranton’s (2000) theoretical work on the influence of identity suggests 
that group specific norms may be an important driver of behavior. If this is true, then gender norms 
suggesting that women should be cooperative and men should be competitive could drive the 
observed gender gap in competitive preferences. In line with this possibility, Akerloff and 
Kranton’s (2000) theoretical work is complemented by anecdotal evidence of such a tension for 
female lawyers whose identity as a lawyer encourages them to be competitive but whose identity 
as a woman encourages the opposite. 
Investigating the role of nature and nurture in the development of competitive preferences, 
Anderson et al. (2013) and Cárdenas et al. (2012) find that there is no gap in competitive 
preferences among young children. These authors argue that puberty marks an important milestone 






a combination of both) explain this result; one possibility is that the observed gender differences 
in preferences are the results of different hormonal fluctuations that do not occur until puberty. In 
support of this possibility, Wozniak et al. (2014) and Buser (2012) find that the menstrual cycle 
and the associated cascade of hormones can predict the presence of a gender gap in competitive 
preferences. Taken together, these works suggest that nature plays a role in the formation of 
competitive preferences.  However, it is similarly plausible that the mechanism behind the role 
puberty plays in this gap is through the recognition of gender norms that comes with sexual 
maturity. In favor of this explanation, Booth and Nolen (2012) compare teenage females who 
attend single sex and co-ed institutions and find that girls who attend single sex institutions have 
competitive preferences similar to the men rather than to the women who attend co-ed schools. 
One possible explanation for this result is that the difference in learning environment affected the 
saliency of gender norms and therefore their effect on behavior. In line with this hypothesis, Almås 
et al. (2015) documents the standard gap in competitive preferences but finds that individuals in 
the top income quartile drive the gap. The authors argue that scarcity and may moderate the effect 
of norms in the exhibition of competitive preferences. Similarly, Cassar et al. (2016) find the 
standard gap when the prize of the competition is monetary but no such gap when the prize is a 
school voucher. They find that women are willing to compete, but they reserve their competitive 
tendencies for the success of their offspring; similar to Almås et al. (2015), these authors find that 
women are willing to compete when they deem the need great enough. Given these results, it is 
unlikely nature alone can explain the formation of competitive preferences as females’ preference 
for competition is environment dependent.  
Consistent with the previous results on the importance of environment, Gneezy et al. (2009) 






competition. The authors find the standard gap in competitive preferences among the patrilineal 
Masai but find that women were more likely to compete than men among the matrilineal Khasi. 
More recently, Dariel et al. (2017) find no gender gap in competitive preferences among Emiratis 
and argue that their results are driven by cultural transition away from the traditional patriarchal 
structure in the United Arab Emirates. Given it unlikely that these populations faced a different set 
of evolutionary pressures, the authors find support in favor of nurture playing a role in the 
development of competitive norms.2  
We contribute to this body of work by documenting the first adult population in the United 
States to exhibit no gender gap in competitive preferences. Directly replicating Niederle and 
Vesterlund’s (2007) original procedure with two novel populations, we find that Hispanic students 
exhibit the standard gap in competitive preferences while no such gap exists among black students. 
Our finding documents a population, which differs solely in culture, exhibiting no gender gap in 
competitive preferences. Although others have documented populations in which there is no 
gender gap in preferences, we are the first, to our knowledge, to provide clear evidence that culture 
and norms must explain at least part of the observed gender gap in competitive preferences. Our 
work relates to Gneezy et al. (2009) and Dariel et al. (2017) with one important distinction: beyond 
cultural variation, the populations they studied experienced different institutions that may 
confound the effects of culture on competitive preferences. Our results illuminate the importance 
of identity in the form of social norms in determining the expression of competitive preferences. 
Additionally, our work highlights the importance of multiple identities in moderating the effect of 
norms on the formation of preferences and their resulting behavior.  
                                                 
2 Gong and Yang (2012), Liu and Huang (2013), and Falk and Hermle (2018) find that another documented gender 






2.3 Experimental Design 
Our design closely follows the experimental design first conducted by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) and was conducted using the Zurich Toolbox for Ready Made Economic 
Experiments (ZTREE; Fischbacher, 2007).  We assign participants to groups containing two men 
and two women. Although we do not explicitly mention gender, participants see the other members 
of their group and therefore its gender composition as well. As in the original study, we ask 
participants to add up random sets of five 2-digit numbers for a total of five minutes under different 
payment schemes. We use this task to avoid gender differences in ability and to ensure 
comparability between our results and those of the original paper.  After a participant submits an 
answer, a new set of randomly generated 2-digit numbers appears as well as feedback on whether 
their previous answer was correct. Participants receive no feedback about the performance of their 
fellow group members at any point, but receive absolute feedback on their performance following 
the conclusion of each task.  Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we provide scrap paper 
but no access to a calculator. Participants completed this task under a number of payment schemes 
in the order described below: 
Task 1 (Piece rate pay scheme): This is the baseline used to measure individual’s ability 
under a non-competitive piece rate scheme and ensure no gender differences in ability. If this task 
is selected for payment, subjects receive $0.50 for each correct answer and their earnings are 
independent of the performance of the other members of their group.   
Task 2 (Competitive pay scheme): This task is identical to task 1 with the important 
exception that in each group the individual who answers the most questions correctly receives 
$2.00 per correct answer while the other members of the group receive nothing. This payment is 






chance of winning should be indifferent between a competitive and non-competitive payment 
scheme. This task is included to investigate whether simply being in a competitive environment 
creates a gender difference in performance.  
Task 3 (Choice): Before the addition task, participants are asked to select which payment 
scheme they would like to be applied to their performance in the case that this task is selected for 
payment. Thus, participants are deciding whether they want to receive $0.50 per correct answer or 
$2.00 per correct answer conditional on being the top performer on their team. If a participant 
picks the competitive scheme, their performance is compared to their group member’s 
performance on the previous task. This task measures individual’s preferences for competition.  
Task 4 (Choice for previous performance): Unlike the previous tasks, participants do not 
have to perform the addition task. Instead, they must decide whether they would like their task 1 
performance to have a piece rate or competitive payment scheme applied. Thus, participants are 
choosing whether they want to receive $0.50 per correct answer from task 1 or $2.00 per correct 
answer in the case where they were the top performer in their group in task 1. This task is necessary 
to identify whether having to perform in a competitive atmosphere has an impact on the gender 
gap in competitive preferences.  
After completing all four tasks, we introduce an incentivized belief elicitation to investigate 
how confidence relates to competitive preferences. We ask participants to guess where they ranked 
among their team in task 1 and 2, and they receive $1 per each correct guess. All of the procedures 
listed above are identical to those used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). We depart from their 
design through the inclusion of an incentivized risk elicitation measure as well as a survey designed 






Our incentivized risk elicitation measure is adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2008), as 
modified in Dave et al. (2010) and then scaled down to be consistent with the payments from the 
other tasks. The measure works as follows: we ask participants to select from among six 50-50 
gambles. Each successive gamble increases in expected return as well as variance. If this task is 
selected for payment, the computer generates a random number for each participant, and if the 
number generated was above 0.5 the participant receives payment A for the gamble they selected 
and payment B otherwise. The choice of gamble indicates a degree of risk tolerance, from none 
(Gamble 1) to risk-seeking (Gamble 6).   
Our survey is included in the appendix. It was designed to measure cultural differences that 
may correlate and perhaps explain differences in the gender gap in competitive preferences across 
different individuals and groups. Items in the survey pertain to individual’s socioeconomic status, 
family structure, ethnicity, self-efficacy and beliefs about proper gender roles.  
We ran the experiment at two locations: The Economics Research Laboratory (ERL) at 
Texas A&M University and the Prairie View Research Laboratory (PVRL) at Prairie View A&M 
University.  We recruited subjects at both locations using the Online Rescruiting System for 
Economics Experiments (ORSEE; Griener, 2015). We ran our Hispanic participant sessions at the 
ERL and the vast majority of our black participant sessions at PVRL. These locations are ideal for 
investigating the role culture may play in competitive preferences by providing access to subjects 
from two populations that are understudied in the competition literature. Although these locations 
are ideal in providing access to unique subjects, there are significant differences across the two 
locations. Texas A&M is a large state school hosting over 53,000 undergraduate students whereas 
Prairie View A&M University is significantly smaller hosting only 9,125 undergraduate students. 






significantly higher average SAT scores (1250 vs. 993). Additionally the demographics of each 
school are significantly different: 23.6% of Texas A&M undergraduate students are Hispanic while 
the same is only true of 9.4% of undergraduate students at Prairie View A&M University. On the 
other hand, 84.7% of undergraduate students are African American at Prairie View A&M 
University (making it a Historically Black University) while the same is only true for 3% of the 
undergraduate students at Texas A&M University.  Lastly, Texas A&M has a roughly equal split 
of male and female undergraduates (47.8% female) while Prairie View A&M has significantly 
more female undergraduates (61% female). In an effort to test for selection concerns, we ran two 
sessions of black participants at Texas A&M (n=20) and compare the behavior of black students 
across campuses and discuss why the differences across campuses are unlikely to explain our 
findings in the results section.   
In total, we have 96 Hispanic and 128 black subjects. On average, subjects earn $20.54 and 
there are no discernible differences in earnings across gender or ethnicity. Sessions included 1 to 
4 groups from a single university and ethnicity. Sessions took less than an hour and participants 
received a $5 show-up fee plus $7 for completing the experiment plus whatever they earned in the 
selected task. Following Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we pay for a single task to avoid 
decisions in one task affecting decisions in another task to hedge over earnings. We ran the first 
wave of sessions in April 2017 as part of an undergraduate research course. During this wave, five 
sessions were run at Texas A&M and four sessions were run at Prairie View A&M University 
producing 56 Hispanic and 64 black subjects respectively. We carried out a second wave of 
sessions during the spring of 2018 including an additional six sessions at Texas A&M University 






for possible concerns over selection as a driver of the primary results. We also ran an additional 
five sessions at Prairie View A&M University producing an additional 64 black subjects.  
2.4 Theory and Hypotheses 
We base our hypotheses on the theoretical work of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). In their 
model, individuals receive increased utility from being members of groups or put another way by 
having identity. Akerloff and Kranton (2000) argue that the magnitude benefit is determined by 
how much an individual values a particular identity and how much the group accepts the 
individual. As a result, individuals have a desire to conform to the norms of a group to increase 
their acceptance by other group members. Taken together, the intuition provided by the model in 
forming our hypotheses is that individuals adjust their behavior to follow the social prescriptions 
of the communities to which they belong. 
In the experiment, the choice of payment scheme is between a low rate, which is guaranteed 
independent of the performance of others, or a high rate, which is only paid in the case that one is 
a top performer. In the absence of identity considerations, ability, confidence (beliefs about one’s 
own ability), and one’s taste for risk should drive competition entry as these determine the expected 
utility of each payment scheme. However, identity changes this decision by suggesting what the 
individual ought to do. In this sense, group identity can lead to additional costs to entering a 
competitive environment. Sociologists have identified the tendency for Western culture to exhibit 
such norms regarding gender: competitiveness is good for men but bad for women (Lorber and 
Farrell, 1991; Rose and Rudolph, 2006). Since females exhibiting aggressive or competitive 
behavior may be acting contrary to their identities prescribed behavior, there may be additional 
costs applied to females entering competition (Akerloff and Kranton 2000). Under these 






man of similar ability, beliefs, and risk preferences. At an aggregate level, this would produce the 
observed gender gap in competitive preferences.  
Beyond this, the model also can accommodate the absence of a gap in certain 
environments. Matrilineal societies (Gneezy et al. 2009) have female-led households, and this may 
create a norm supporting female competitiveness. Single-sex schools (Booth and Nolen 2012) 
reduce the salience of gender norms, allowing women to avoid the identity-based utility loss from 
entering competition. Moreover, low socioeconomic status (Almås et al. 2015) implies scarcity 
that crowds out the cost of norm violation especially in the case of mothers.  
The model similarly explains the success of institutions in decreasing the gap. The 
introduction of affirmative action policies (Niederle et al. 2013) replaces the standard norm by 
implying women should compete. Team competition (Healy and Pate, 2011; Dargnies 2012) adds 
a cooperative element, a trait that women are expected to exhibit. Lastly, because women are 
expected to ensure the survival of offspring, introducing an incentive scheme directly related to 
the success of one’s offspring shifts female competitiveness to being viewed positively (Cassar et 
al. 2016).   
Although a number of differences exist between Hispanic and black culture, we focus on 
the differences in gender norms across populations. Sociologists find suggestive survey evidence 
that Hispanic individuals hold less egalitarian gender norms than white individuals (Harris and 
Firestone, 1995; Kane, 2000). Within our theoretical framework, this suggests potentially larger 
differences in gender competitiveness in our Hispanic sample relative to the original study. On the 
other hand, the black population contains a large number of single-mother and female-headed 
households (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). In the case of single motherhood, the mother is the sole 






that this in turn produces daughters who learn that being competitive is good.  In line with this 
hypothesis, sociologists find that black individuals tend to hold more positive beliefs about 
maternal employment (Blee and Tickamyer, 1995) and tend to show greater recognition of gender 
inequality (Hunter and Sellers, 1998). Given these assumed cultural norms regarding 
competitiveness, the model predicts a difference across our subject pools. 
Hypothesis 1 (Hispanic Competitiveness): We expect to observe a gender gap in 
competitive preferences in the Hispanic population. Controlling for differences in ability, Hispanic 
men will be significantly more likely to opt for a competitive pay scheme relative to their female 
counterparts. 
 Hypothesis 1a (Hispanic Competitiveness relative to Original Study):  We expect to 
observe a gender gap in competitive preferences in the Hispanic population that is larger than the 
original study which was conducted with a predominantly white sample. 
Hypothesis 2 (Black Competitiveness): We expect to observe no gender gap in competitive 
preferences in the black population. Controlling for differences in ability, black men and women 
will be equally likely to opt for a competitive pay scheme.   
2.5 Results 
In the following section, we discuss the results of our experiment. We begin by comparing 
the choice of payment scheme in task 3 across gender and ethnicity followed by investigating how 
differences in performance and beliefs about performance may explain our results. We repeat the 
same analysis for the choice of payment scheme in task 4 and conclude by discussing selection 








2.5.1 Tournament Entry 
Turning first to the main measure of interest, the rate of entry into the tournament, when 
the data is pooled, men opt for tournament payment about 52% of the time while the same is 
only true for 43% of the women. This difference is significant (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.05) but 
reflects a much smaller gap than reported in the original Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) paper 
(9% vs. 35%).    
 
Figure 2.1: Proportion of Subjects Selecting Competitive Payment Scheme in Task 3 
 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of individuals choosing the competitive payment scheme 
in each sample split by gender. When we divide the entry decisions by ethnicity, we find that the 
gender gap in competition entry within the Hispanic sample is significantly different from the one 
found within the black sample. Hispanic men opt for a competitive pay scheme more than twice 
as often as Hispanic women (75% and 35% respectively). This gap in competitive preferences is 
statistically significant (Fisher's exact, p<0.001), but not significantly different from the original 
results. On the other hand, our black sample exhibits no significant gender gap with men and 
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The aggregate data support our hypothesis that culture plays a role in the development of 
competitive preferences. However, it is possible that performance differences rather than 
differences in competitive preferences explains the difference in competition entry across samples. 
2.5.2 Performance Differences 
We detect no significant gender difference in performance on the addition task. In the 
piece rate payment (task 1), men correctly answer an average of 6.91 questions while women 
correctly answer 7.30 questions; the difference in distributions of correct answers is not 
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney, p=0.22). Looking towards task 2 (tournament payment), 
men correctly answer 8.50 questions relative to 8.59 questions for women. Although the 
improvement across tasks is significant for both men and women (two-sided t-test, p<0.001 for 
both), neither improvement nor performance in task 2 are significantly different across gender 
(Mann-Whitney, p=0.34 and p=0.90 respectively). Among the 61 groups created during the 
experiment, women were the top performer in their group in second task 31 times, while men 
were the top performer in their group 29 times. We conclude that there exists no difference in 
performance across gender. However, it is possible that this approach masks heterogeneity in 
performance within our sampled populations. 
Figure 2.2 presents the cumulative distribution of performance on the first and second task 
for the Hispanic sample in the left and right panel respectively. For every performance level, the 
graph displays the number of Hispanic men and women who did as well or worse on the addition 
task. In task 1 (piece rate payment), Hispanic men solved an average of 8.54 problems compared 
to 8.58 problems for the women. This difference is not significant (Mann-Whitney, p=0.96). 
Turning to the task 2, we continue to detect no significant performance differences in the Hispanic 






correctly answer 9.67 questions, (Mann-Whitney, p=0.42).  Similar to our aggregate analysis, the 
improvement in performance is significant for Hispanic men and women (two-sided t-test, p<0.01 
for both) but not significantly different across gender (Mann-Whitney, p=0.15). Among the 24 
Hispanic groups, men and women were the top performer in their group 12 times each. Taken 
together, we conclude that performance differences cannot explain any observed difference in 
competitive preferences within the Hispanic population. 
 
Figure 2.2: CDF of Correctly Solved Problems - Hispanic Sample  
 
 
Repeating the same analysis for the black sample (figure 2.3), we find that black women 
slightly outperform men on task 1 answering 6.45 questions correctly on average compared to 5.85 
questions for the men (Mann-Whitney, p=0.06). However, looking at performance under a 
competitive pay scheme (task 2), the marginal difference is eliminated; men answer an average of 
7.38 problems compared to an average of 7.89 for the females (Mann-Whitney, p=0.37). Although 
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for both), the difference in improvement is not (Mann-Whitney, p=0.95). Among the 37 black 
groups, women were the top performer in their group 20 times. Again, we conclude that 
performance differences cannot explain any observed gap in competitive preferences. 
 
Figure 2.3: CDF of Correctly Solved Problems- Black Sample 
 
 
Figure 2.4 presents the competition entry decisions of Hispanic (left panel) and black (right 
panel) subjects conditional on their previous performance under a competitive pay scheme (task 
2). The left panel illustrates that for every performance quartile Hispanic men are more likely to 
opt for a competitive pay scheme than their female counterparts. Although more Hispanic women 
enter as their performance improves, Hispanic women from the top quartile are as likely to enter 
as Hispanic men from the worst quartile. We conclude that Hispanic men opt for competition at a 
higher rate regardless of actual performance. Turning to the second panel, we see that among our 
black sample the gender gap in competition entry that is found in panel A only occurs for those in 




















Number of Correct Solutions





















Number of Correct Solutions







those in third quartile of performance (Fisher's exact, p=0.06), in every other quartile black women 
are equally or more likely to opt for competition than their male counterparts. 
 
Figure 2.4: Proportion of Subjects Selecting Competitive Payment Scheme for Task 3 
Conditional on Tournament (Task 2) Performance  
 
 
To investigate the role that performance plays in competition entry and the observed gender 
gap, we estimate a probit model of competition entry conditioned on gender, ethnicity, 
performance in the second task and the amount of improvement between task 1 and task 2. We 
present the results of this regression in table 2.1. Consistent with the earlier analysis, being a female 
has a large negative impact on the probability of entering competition. However, this is only true 
of Hispanic females as the positive effect of being black conditional on being a female is almost 
as large as the coefficient on the female dummy. Overall, we conclude that performance 
























































































Table 2.1: Probit of Competition Entry in Task 3 
 
 
2.5.3 Beliefs about Tournament (Task 2) Performance 
 Although performance differences do not appear to explain the gap in competitive 
preferences, it is possible that a discontinuity between performance and beliefs about performance 
explains our results. To investigate this concern, figure 2.5 presents the frequency of guessed rank 
in task 2 for the Hispanic (left panel) and black (right panel) subjects. Looking at the left panel, 
we can see Hispanic men exhibit a significantly higher level of confidence and are over twice as 
likely to believe they were the best performer in their group (two-sided t-test, p<0.01).  Given that 
we detected no difference in performance on the task, Hispanic males must be overconfident 
relative to their female counterparts. In line with this, Hispanic males are more likely to incorrectly 
rank themselves, and, in every case of incorrect ranking, Hispanic males ranked themselves higher 







Figure 2.5: Distribution of Guessed Tournament (Task 2) Rank 
 
 
Table 2.2: Accuracy of Guessed Tournament Rank (Task 2)  
 
 
Turning to the black sample, we see the distribution of beliefs are almost identical for every 
belief quartile. Black males and females are equally likely to guess they are the best performers in 
their group (two-sided t-test, p=1.00). Similar to the Hispanic population, males tend to incorrectly 
rank themselves more often. However, the probability of over-ranking conditional on being 

















































we conduct an ordered probit estimating guessed rank based on gender and actual performance 
(table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3: Ordered Probit of Guessed Tournament Rank (Task 2) 
 
 The results of table 2.3 confirm the intuition provided by table 2.2 and figure 2.5. After 
controlling for performance, men are still significantly more confident relative to their female 
counterparts. Similar to entry decisions, this effect is much larger for Hispanic sample. We 
conclude that males are overconfident in their beliefs, but the gap in confidence is much larger for 
the Hispanic sample.  We investigate the role overconfidence plays in explaining the observed gap 
in competitive preferences by repeating the earlier probit analysis with the additional control of 
participant beliefs. 
The repeated probit analysis (table 2.4) shows that beliefs have a strong positive 
relationship with competition entry and that performance impacts competition entry primarily 
through beliefs.3 Overconfidence explains part of the gap in entry, but beliefs alone cannot explain 
                                                 
3 Recall that a lower rank means higher confidence, as a rank of 1 is a belief in being the best performer, while a 
rank of 4 is a belief in being the worst performer. Thus, the negative coefficient captures a positive relationship 






the pattern of competition entry in our sample. Overall, we conclude that the observed pattern of 
behavior is robust to alternative explanations involving beliefs and performance differences as 
these alone cannot explain the presence or lack of a gender gap in tournament entry in our samples. 
 




2.5.4 Choice for Past Performance (Task 4) Analysis 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) highlight an alternative explanation that their results may 
reflect preferences over having to perform in competitive environment instead of preferences 
towards competitive incentives. To test for this concern, task 4 is introduced. In this task, 
participants did not have to perform the real effort task. Instead, they simply chose whether they 
would prefer to have a tournament or piece rate payment applied to their first task performance. 
Figure 2.6 presents a comparison of entry by gender and ethnicity for both task 3 and task 
4. Although the gap in entry for task 4 is smaller for the Hispanic sample, the gap is still large and 






3, but the gap in entry is still not significant (Fisher's exact, p=0.28). On the surface, we conclude 
that apprehension for competition does not explain the gender gap in entry. However, similar to 
task 3, it is still possible that performance differences or beliefs explain the presence or lack of a 
significant gender gap in our samples.   
 
Figure 2.6: Comparison of Proportion of Subjects Selecting Competitive Payment Scheme in 
Task 3 and Task 4 
 
 
We delve into the relationship between payment choice in task 4 and performance in task 
1 in figure 2.7.  Looking at the Hispanic sample (left panel), both genders exhibits a strong positive 
relationship between performance and opting for a competitive pay scheme in task 4. There is still 
clear separation in entry illustrating that Hispanic men opt for a competitive scheme more often 
than Hispanic women at every performance quartile. On the other hand, the black sample appears 
to exhibit no gap in entry among those who should enter (the top two quartiles), but males who 
perform in the lower quartiles appear to over-enter similar to Hispanic males. Performance seems 
to have little effect on competition entry for black males, as they are equally likely to enter if they 
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Figure 2.7: Proportion of Participants Selecting Competitive Payment Scheme in Task 4 
Conditional on Task 1 Performance 
 
 
Repeating our earlier probit analysis, table 2.5 suggests apprehension to having to perform 
in a competitive environment cannot explain the observed gender gap in entry as females are still 
less likely to opt for a tournament payment scheme after controlling for performance. Although 
the gender effect is smaller for the black sample, we can no longer claim that there is no gap in 
entry for the black population. However, in tangent with the task 3 results, this would imply black 
women are eager rather than apprehensive to compete.  Before concluding our task 4 analysis, we 
consider the role that beliefs play in tournament entry in task 4. 
 






















































































Figure 2.8 presents the distribution of guessed ranks in task 1 for the Hispanic (left panel) 
and black (right panel) samples. Similar to task 3, Hispanic men ranked themselves higher than 
Hispanic women with close to half the men believing they were the best performer in their group.  
Although not as large as the difference for the Hispanic population, black men are also more likely 
to believe they were the top performer in their group. However, the difference in average ranking 
is only significant for the Hispanic population. 
 
Figure 2.8: Distribution of Guessed Piece Rate (Task 1) Rank  
 
 
Table 2.6 presents an ordered probit model predicting guessed piece rate rank. In line with 
the task 3 results, females rank themselves significantly lower but the effect is much smaller for 
black sample. To see how the difference in beliefs predicts competition entry we repeat the probit 
analysis with the added control of guessed piece rate rank in table 2.7. Again, we find that 
overconfidence explains part of the gender gap in entry, but females are still significantly less 
likely to submit their past performance for a competitive payment even after controlling for beliefs. 
















































conclude that apprehension to competing cannot explain the observed difference in competitive 
preferences. 
 
Table 2.6: Ordered Probit of Guessed Piece Rate Rank (Task 1) 
 
 





A final alternative explanation for our results is school selection. Texas A&M University 
is more competitive than Prairie View A&M University and thus student’s choice of university 






competitive environments, we would expect selection to produce an effect opposing our results: 
competitive women would select into Texas A&M while the effect on males should be limited as 
men are ''innately'' competitive. Thus, we would predict no gap in Preferences at Texas A&M and 
the standard gap at Prairie View A&M. 
To investigate the possibility of selection driving our results, we ran two sessions of black 
students at Texas A&M. table 2.8 presents a comparison of our black subjects from each university 
along dimensions that may affect competitive preferences. The only notable difference is that the 
gap in competitive preferences is larger among Texas A&M black students. Of note, this gap is 
much smaller than that found in the Hispanic sample (10% vs. 35%). This difference may be 
predicted from our model of behavior. As Texas A&M tends to be more competitive and a 
predominantly white college, the associated social norms may be more salient for black females 
at Texas A&M relative to their Prairie View counterparts causing them to act behave less 
competitively. 
 
Table 2.8: Comparison across Campuses 
 
 
 Texas A&M University- Hispanic 
(N=96) 
Texas A&M University-Black 
(N=20) 
Prairie View A&M University 
(N=128) 
Number of Problems Solved 
(Average of Task 1 + 2) 
9.26 7.30  6.84  
Women 9.13 7.20  7.18  
Men 9.39 7.40  6.49  
Tournament Entry 0.55 0.45  0.48  
Women: 0.35 0.40  0.48  
Men: 0.75 0.50  0.48  
Guessed Tournament Rank 
(1=Best)               (4=Worst) 
1.86 2.05  1.88  
Women: 2.15 2.00  1.89  






To test whether selection can explain our results, we repeat all of our regression analysis 
including dummies for black students at Texas A&M in the appendix. The magnitudes of 
coefficients change in some circumstances but the coefficients on the A&M black dummies never 
attain significance and their inclusion does not change the qualitative conclusions: Hispanic 
subjects exhibit the standard gender gap in competition while no such gap exists in the black 
sample. We conclude that it is unlikely that selection at the university level explains our pattern of 
results. 
2.5.6 Survey 
 After the experimental conditions, subjects completed a short survey including an 
incentivized and self-reported risk measure4, questions about ethnicity, and measures of self-
image. Because the competitive payment scheme introduces risk into payment, it is possible that 
our results are a reflection of risk preferences rather than competitive preferences.  Consistent with 
the original paper (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), we find the females in both samples are more risk 
averse than their male counterparts in an incentivized setting, but the difference in risk preferences 
is only significant for the black sample (two-sided t-test, p=0.14 for Hispanics, p<0.01 for blacks). 
In a second measure taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, women in both 
samples are significantly less willing to take risks (two-sided t-test, p<0.001 for both samples). 
We repeat the probit analysis of competition entry in task 3 adding both risk measures in table 9. 
Both risk measures predict competition entry and explain part of the gap but the female and female 
black interaction are still significant. We conclude that differences in risk preferences contribute 
to the observed gap but cannot fully explain it.  
                                                 
4 The self-reported risk measure was taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and ask participants to 
rank how willing they are to take risks on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 representing being “completely unwilling to 






Table 2.9: Repeated Probit Analysis of Task 3 Competition Entry with Beliefs about Relative 
Performance and Measures of Risk Aversion 
 
 
Instead, our results support our hypotheses, which are based on the belief that Hispanic and 
black culture differ in ways that alter norms regarding competitiveness. The self-reported measures 
of confidence and self-efficacy support the experimental evidence: Although women in both 
samples tend to be less confident, the gap is almost twice as large for the Hispanic sample (two-
sided t-test, p<0.01 for Hispanics, p=0.06 for blacks).  Similarly, black women are significantly 
more likely to believe they are in control of their outcomes than their Hispanic counterparts (two-
sided t-test, p<0.001), and the gender difference in self-efficacy is only significant for the Hispanic 
sample (two-sided t-test, p<0.05).   
 Looking at the items focused on cultural variation, we find a notable difference in family 
structure. Our black participants are close to three times as likely to come from a single mother 
home (Fisher’s exact, p<0.001) and fifty percent more likely to report that a female led their 
household (Fisher’s exact, p<0.01).  Similarly, our black participants, particularly females, tend to 






difference exists for paternal education (two-sided t-test, p=0.89). Taken together, these survey 
measures indicate that relative to the Hispanic sample, our black participants come from a culture 
of strong female role models. 
To examine how these differences effect competitive preferences, we repeat our probit 
analysis including participant responses to the survey as well as their interactions with ethnicity 
and gender (table 2.10)5. Both the effect of being female and being a black female are no longer 
significant implying that our cultural measures capture at least some of the differences between 
our groups that produce differences in competitive preferences.  Black women with single mothers 
or female heads of households are more likely to compete while the opposite is true for Hispanic 
women. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the impact of these factors depends on the 
cultural view of them. 
 
Table 2.10: Repeated Probit Analysis of Task 3 Competition Entry with Beliefs about 
Relative Performance, Measures of Risk Aversion, and Cultural Controls 
 
                                                 







 If culture explains our pattern of results, then it is possible that we detect such differences 
within our samples as well. Our model predicts that Hispanic women who identify more strongly 
with their ethnicity would be more likely to follow the associated gender norm to avoid 
competition while the opposite would hold true for black women.  In a final exercise looking 
directly at group membership, figure 2.9 presents the proportion of subjects entering competition 
based on how strongly they identify with their ethnicity. Participants responded to a prompt asking 
how important their ethnicity was to them with responses ranging from ''1: Not at all'' to 4:''Very 
Important.''  The black sample identified strongly with their ethnicity: 73% of the black sample 
said that their ethnicity was very important to them while the same occurred only 45% of the time 
in the Hispanic Sample.  
 
Figure 2.9: Proportion of Participants Selecting Competitive Payment Scheme in Task 3 




































































































Looking at the female (left) panel of figure 2.9, the pattern of entry supports our hypotheses 
regarding culture: the more connected a Hispanic female feels to her ethnic identity, the less likely 
she is to enter competition while the opposite is true for black females. In contrast but consistent 
with the hypothesis that cultural norms matter, the male panel shows no discernible difference in 
entry based on ethnic affiliation. Since we hypothesize that males are encouraged to compete 
independent of culture, it follows that strength of ethnicity should not have a large impact on 
competitive preferences.  In line with the theory, we find the stronger an individual associates with 
their group, the stronger the inclination to follow that groups behavioral prescriptions. Although 
we cannot control the treatment of culture as we would other treatments in the laboratory, our 
survey provides compelling evidence that these cultures differ and these differences affect the 
existence of a gender gap in competitive preferences. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Although researchers have identified and replicated the presence of a gender gap in 
competitive preferences over the past ten years, it is an open question what drives the observed 
gap.  Some authors have found evidence in favor of the role biology may play in the development 
of these preferences, but others have pointed to the importance of nurture. We add to this literature 
by comparing two populations that differ solely in culture and find a stark contrast in competitive 
preferences. We show that our Hispanic sample exhibits the standard competition gap, but we find 
no such gap exists among our black sample.  Further, we illustrate that alternative explanations 
such as selection or confidence cannot explain our pattern of results. In addition, our survey 
measures highlight the existence of cultural variation in our samples and that this cultural variation 
contributes the formation of competitive preferences. Taken together, this paper illustrates the 






In a broader sense, our work joins others such as Benjamin et al. (2010) in finding that 
preferences are not determined solely at the individual level but instead that our identity and the 
groups to which we belong play a role in the formation and expression of preferences. Similar to 
their work, our results highlight how identity such as gender or culture can systematically influence 
preferences. However, our work also joins others such as Gelfand et al. (2017) who find that the 
effect of norms on behavior is often context and environment dependent.  This paper contributes 
to research on identity by highlighting the importance of multiple identities in understanding the 
strength of specific group norms. Our work highlights how one identity may moderate the effect 
of another identity’s group specific norms on behavior. We find that the influence of identity, 
specifically gender, on behavior is not the same for all members but instead depends on its 
interaction with other relevant identities such as ethnicity. Our work highlights the importance and 
value of considering multiple identities in deepening our understanding of the strength and 
importance of norms in forming preferences and their resulting behavior.    
Policymakers interested in reducing the gender gap in labor market outcomes should focus 
on campaigns targeting social norms. Although equality is closer to reality than it was a century 
ago, it is difficult to argue that different social groups receive equal treatment by society. Our work 
adds to a growing literature that shows identity affects behavior through sending signals about 
what individuals ought to do.  As long as the signal remains that women are not meant to compete, 
we believe it unlikely if not impossible to achieve gender equality in labor market outcomes. 
Although shifting social norms is daunting, promising campaigns such as, #likeagirl, have already 
begun work on shifting the view that female competitiveness is a negative trait. We hope that our 
work encourages other organizations to pursue similar campaigns that encourage norms focused 






3. TRUST AND BETRAYAL: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INFLUENCE OF 
IDENTITY 
3.1 Introduction 
Although evolutionary biologists have suggested that the formation of social groups may 
have been essential to survival, group identity has been a source of constant conflict throughout 
modern human history. The innate tendency to categorize individuals into groups has naturally led 
to discrimination and in extreme cases the generation of groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), which explicitly preach the destruction of the out-group. Many major and minor 
conflicts have had their roots in identity including World War II, The Rwandan Genocide, and 
more recently, the shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh; yet, this list does not begin 
to scratch the surface of the number of deaths rooted in identity conflict. These instances may 
differ in the specific reason for conflict, but in most, if not all cases, misunderstanding and mistrust 
play a key role.  
In a world in which the internet has allowed globalization to thrive, companies and 
individuals face a growing number of interactions with customers and employees outside of their 
social circles. Although in some cases this has led to greater understanding and empathy among 
social groups, it has also forced cultures to interact precipitating conflict among contrasting 
viewpoints that intensifies group divides.  Beyond this, recent years have seen the rise of global 
problems such as global warming and nuclear proliferation requiring cooperation among diverse 
groups to establish global solutions.  Ideally, individuals’ identities would not factor into the 
decision to interact with others; however, a growing body of literature has found that this is not 






the costs of identity conflict and the benefits of cooperation, it is necessary to understand what 
drives observed in-group bias.  
Akerloff and Kranton’s (2000) seminal work on identity economics provides a framework 
for understanding how identity may influence actions and discusses how such a framework can be 
used to explain a series of befuddling findings. Their work highlights the importance of group 
identity in explaining behavior others would deem irrational including costly conflict. In line with 
this theoretical work, researchers have shown that given the option, participants prefer to enter 
trusting relationships with members of their in-group even if it is costly to do so (Fershtman, et al. 
2005; Falk and Zehnder, 2013; Banuri et al. 2012). This unfair treatment of the out-group and 
nepotism towards the in-group is observed as taste-based discrimination which causes disparity in 
opportunity and economic outcomes across social groups. We seek to add to our understanding of 
this preference by investigating the mechanism behind in-group bias in trust.  
To do so, we expand the experimental design first introduced by Bohnet and Zeckhauser 
(2004) in which the authors examine how the decision to trust differs from a similarly risky 
decision. The authors identify two major departures in that there is another individual who may 
earn more than the decision maker and the outcome of trust is determined by another individual as 
opposed to chance. The researchers found that the latter causes individuals to be significantly less 
likely to take a risk, and coin this motivation, betrayal aversion. We build on this work by 
investigating whether the cost of betrayal varies with the identity of the betrayer and how this may 
explain the presence of in-group bias in trust.  
On the surface, we replicate others in finding the presence of in-group bias in trust. On 
average, participants require the chance of their trust being reciprocated to be roughly ten percent 






that this premium is driven by betrayal concerns rather than concerns over relative earnings. Our 
results provide deeper understanding of in-group bias in trust and how it may be reduced to 
encourage intergroup cooperation. Our work highlights that the observed in-group bias in trust is 
due to emotional considerations related to betrayal and the desire to conform to group ideals rather 
than concerns over potential disadvantageous inequality in earnings. With this in mind, policy 
makers should focus on policies that encourage intergroup cooperation through shielding 
individuals from potential betrayals or decreasing the cost in terms of group affiliation of trusting 
an individual from another group. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) provide the first theoretical work on the effects of group 
membership. Synthesizing a number of previous experimental results, they argue that the mere 
recognition of two distinct groups (social categorization) is sufficient to produce intergroup 
discrimination. They define this tendency to favor members of one’s group as in-group bias. 
Turner et al. (1979) introduce the concept of the minimal group to study the general effect of group 
membership. In their study, participants were lead to believe they are assigned to groups based on 
painting preferences. The authors found that this categorization alone was sufficient to cause 
participants to feel attached and to hold positive beliefs about their group. Beyond this, the authors 
found that participants tended to give more money to members of their group when dividing a set 
amount of money among other participants.  
Since their original publication, a number of experimental economics studies have 
attempted to incorporate the minimal group paradigm to study the influence of identity on 
individual behavior. Eckel and Grossman (2005) used a number of group assignment methods to 






is not enough, but when group members interact, they later donate significantly more to a public 
good that benefits the in-group. Chen and Li (2009) expanded on this work by testing a similar 
range of group assignments using a menu of games first employed in Charness and Rabin (2002) 
to identify the effect of group identity on distributional preferences. They found that individuals 
are more likely to pick social welfare maximizing actions, are less like to exhibit envy and are less 
likely to punish when their partner is a member of the same group. Building on this work, Chen 
and Chen (2011) and Li and Liu (2017) find evidence that more efficient equilibria can be reached 
when in-group matching occurs with artificial group assignment. Using real groups, Holm and 
Nystedt (2005) and Falk and Zehnder (2013) find that individuals tend to exhibit greater trust in 
members of their in-group and that this trust leads to more socially desirable outcomes. Taken 
together, this body of research illustrates that identity can be effective in promoting social welfare, 
but only in the case in which individuals are interacting with other members of their group.  
Although identity can be effective in encouraging socially desirable behavior with in-group 
members, it can lead to inefficient outcomes in intergroup interactions. One such example is the 
work of Berhnhard et al. (2006) in which indigenous tribes in Papua New Guinea play a classic 
dictator game with punishment. The authors found that participants are more lenient towards in-
group norm violators and apply more punishment when the victim of the violation is an in-group 
member. Goette et al. (2006) exploit random assignment of soldiers to platoons in the Swiss army 
to study the effect of group identity on cooperation and punishment, and found that their 
participants were more likely to cooperate with members of their platoon and less likely to punish 
defection from fellow platoon members. Both experiments find that individuals are less likely to 
punish members of their in-group, which may imply the emotional cost of in-group betrayal is 






may influence the amount of punishment that is levied. Looking directly at trust, Banuri et al. 
(2012) find that participants prefer to enter trusting relationships with members of their in-group 
even if it is costly to do so. Taken together, this research illustrates that identity can encourage 
cooperation among the in-group but can also lead to unfair and inefficient treatment of out-group 
members. Our work expands on this literature by investigating the mechanism behind the 
previously found in-group bias in trust. 
To do so, we expand the design first introduced by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) in which 
the authors investigate how the decision to trust differs from a similarly risky decision. The authors 
identify the existence of betrayal aversion, or that participants are significantly less likely to take 
a gamble when another person as opposed to chance determines its outcome. In follow-up work, 
Bohnet et al. (2008, 2010) illustrate that the presence of betrayal aversion is robust as it appears in 
a large number of countries that vary widely in culture. Introducing an individual level betrayal 
aversion measure, Aimone and Houser (2012) show that the potential for betrayal leads to a 35% 
drop in the number of individuals willing to take a risk, but in later work, that betrayal aversion 
can be beneficial in increasing trustworthy behavior (Aimone and Houser, 2011, 2013). 
Additionally, Aimone et al. (2014) show that the decision to trust which includes a potential 
betrayal activates different areas of the brain (generally associated with emotion) than a similarly 
risky decision with no betrayal potential. Taken together, this body of research illustrates that the 
decision to trust is different from other risky decisions and this difference is driven by the 
possibility of realized betrayal.  
Most similar to our work, Hong and Bohnet (2007) investigate how betrayal aversion may 
manifest differently in different real social groups. They conclude that the level of betrayal 






aversion. Their work documents the presence of different levels of betrayal aversion across social 
groups but does not measure potential differences in betrayal aversion caused by interactions 
between social groups. Beyond this, their work illustrates that general in-group bias may be 
difficult to identify because of differences across real groups in status and norms. To avoid this 
potential confound, we exploit random assignment to dormitories at Rice University and elicit 
participants willingness to risk a betrayal conditional on whether the potential betrayer is a member 
of their in-group.  In doing so, we can cleanly identify how the shared identity of a potential 
betrayer affects the propensity to trust and in a larger sense how betrayal aversion affects 
intergroup interaction. Our work adds to our understanding of betrayal aversion and trusting 
behavior in general by being the first to cleanly isolate the mechanism underlying general in-group 
bias in trust.  
3.3 Experimental Design 
3.3.1 The Original Trust Game 
The treatments themselves are all variations on the aptly named “Trust Game” introduced 
by Berg, Dickhaut, Mccabe (1995). In the original experiment, a first mover must decide how 
much of a $10 endowment to send to a second mover in a one-shot interaction. Any amount sent 
to the second mover is tripled and then the second mover has the option of returning any of the 
tripled amount to the first mover. Standard game theory with payoff maximizing agents predicts 
any rational second mover will not return any money and, anticipating this, any first mover will 
not send any money, leading to the Nash prediction of zero sent and zero returned. Yet, the original 
experiment, and the body of experimental literature that it spawned, have shown that first movers 
trust, regularly sending an amount greater than zero, and second movers reciprocate, tending to 






Following Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), we adopt a binary version of this game in which 
first movers decide whether to trust a second mover, while the second movers decide whether they 
want to reciprocate in the case that they are trusted. The general structure of the game is depicted 
below in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Dyadic Trust Game 
 
 
As illustrated by the figure, first movers choose “A” or “B.” Choosing “B” is similar to 
sending the entire endowment of $10, or trusting the second mover, whereas choosing “A” is 
similar to sending nothing.  We elicit second mover’s preferences using the strategy method: 
second movers choose “1” or “2” to be implemented in the case that their first mover picks option 
“B.” Choosing “1” is akin to returning more than what was sent, reciprocating on the first mover’s 
trust, whereas choosing “2” is similar to the second mover choosing to send back less than the 
amount that was sent to them. 
3.3.2 Minimal Acceptable Probabilities (MAPs) 






strategy method for first movers. First movers face a similar decision to that depicted in figure 3.1.  
However, they make this decision conditional on the probability of receiving the higher payoff in 
B: first movers provide their minimal acceptable probability (MAP), the lowest chance of 
receiving the higher payoff at which they prefer option B over option A.  Participants are informed 
that we implement option B whenever their MAP is lower than the actual probability of receiving 
the higher payoff, i.e. if a participant picks a MAP of 50% then we will only implement option B 
if the actual probability of receiving the higher payoff is greater than or equal to 50%, otherwise 
we implement option A. Adopting this approach allows us to avoid concerns about the direct role 
beliefs6 may play in behavior as the actions of a first mover in the standard trust game are likely 
to be related to their subjective beliefs about the trustworthiness of their counterpart (Goette et al. 
2006; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Eckel and Petrie, 2011). We avoid this concern by allowing 
participants to express their preferences for every possible level of trustworthiness. Additionally, 
this elicitation (combined with the separate treatments) allows for a finer identification of the 
specific mechanisms underlying trust by allowing more variation in participant’s elicited degree 
of trust.  
 Figure 3.2 depicts the variations of the binary trust game used as treatments within our 
experiment. The first treatment, the trust game, is our treatment of interest while the other two 
serve as controls allowing us to cleanly separate various motivations affecting the propensity to 
trust. Below, we describe the difference between the treatments and their purpose. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Aimone and Houser (2012) discuss a venue through which beliefs may effect MAPS. We discuss this possibility in 






Figure 3.2: Experimental Treatments 
 
 
3.3.3 The Trust Game Treatment 
At the start of each session, we randomly assign participants to be either the first or the 
second mover. First movers decide the lowest probability (MAP) of being paired with a second 
mover who picked “1” at which they prefer “B” over “A”. Participants are informed that we will 
implement an option based on their MAP: if the proportion of second movers who selected “1” is 
greater than their MAP then we implement “B” and “A” otherwise.  If “B” is implemented, the 
outcome is determined by the decision of a paired second mover. 
Following Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), we intend not to give the impression to second 
movers that their decisions could affect the probability of their decision being implemented. 
Second movers are only informed that they are selecting an outcome in the case that their partner 
picks “B”. After making their decision, we inform second movers about the method in which we 
implement decisions.   
We interpret participant’s statement of MAP is as the participant’s willingness to enter a 
trusting relationship. We conduct two additional treatments to understand how betrayal aversion 






3.3.4 The Risky Dictator Treatment 
Similar to the trust game treatment, we randomly assign participants to one of two roles at 
the onset of the session. The difference between this treatment and the trust game is the way in 
which the outcome in option B is determined. As before, first movers are asked to state the lowest 
probability (MAP) of receiving “1” at which they prefer taking “B” over “A”. However, in this 
treatment, nature as opposed to another participant determines the outcome in option B. 
Participants not in the role of first mover act as passive receivers of the outcome determined by 
nature and their paired counterpart.  Following Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), the probability of 
nature selecting the higher first mover payoff is set equal to the proportion of second movers who 
selected the higher first mover payoff in the first treatment for comparability.  
We compare aggregate MAP in this treatment to that from the trust game to investigate how 
betrayal aversion affects the propensity to trust. Since the only difference between the two 
treatments is how the outcome is determined, we interpret larger aggregate MAP in the trust game 
as participants exhibiting betrayal aversion. We conduct one final treatment to separate the effect 
of risk aversion and other regarding preferences on the decision to trust. 
3.3.5 The Decision Problem Treatment 
Similar to the previous treatments, we ask participants to state their desire to take option B 
in the form of the lowest probability of receiving $15. However, this treatment differs in the lack 
of a second player; the decisions made by participants in this condition only affect their own 
payoffs.  
We compare aggregate MAP from this treatment to that from the risky dictator condition 
to determine how other regarding preferences (altruism, inequality aversion, etc.) affect the 






the two treatments as participants expressing preferences over the earnings of others and 
efficiency. We interpret MAP from this treatment as a pure measure of risk preferences as 
participants are expressing their desire to take a gamble over a sure option. Thus, any MAP greater 
than the risk neutral point7 is interpreted as participants exhibiting risk aversion. 
Taken together, the three treatments allow us to isolate separate motivations to trust. 
Aggregate MAP from the trust game provides a measure of the overall propensity to trust. We 
compare aggregate MAP from the trust and risky dictator games to identify how betrayal aversion 
contributes to the propensity to trust. We compare aggregate MAP from the risky dictator game 
with the decision problem to identify how concerns over others’ earnings affects the propensity to 
trust. Lastly, the aggregate MAP from the decision problem allows us to identify how risk aversion 
contributes to the propensity to trust.  
3.3.6 Ex-post Survey  
Following each treatment, each participant completed a short survey. We designed the 
survey to control for various concerns that may affect our results. The survey included a measure 
of generalized trust, various relevant demographics, and the strength of one’s affiliation to their 
residential college.  
3.3.7 Random Assignment to Real Identities 
To isolate the mechanism behind in-group favoritism in trust, we expand the original 
design introduced in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) to include the within-subjects factor of 
identity. Participants still experience only one of the treatments described above but in the 
treatments where another player is present (trust and risky dictator), participants make two 
decisions: one with a member of their in-group and another with a member of their out-group. We 
                                                 






inform participants that the order of decisions as well as which decision is implemented for 
payment is randomly determined.   
Given the work of Hong and Bohnet (2007), we paid close attention to the identities we 
used to avoid potential confounds in status and norm differentials. We conducted our study at Rice 
University in the fall of 2016 as it provides an ideal test bed for measuring the general effects of 
group membership. Incoming freshman have no control over the initial residential college 
assignment minus a few exceptions8. Students spend their first weeks on campus being 
indoctrinated into their college and must spend meals with fellow members of their college for the 
duration of their stay; Students can be seen sporting clothes that signify their allegiance to their 
residential college, and students regularly compete in friendly competition against members of 
other residential colleges. Similar to Goette et al. (2006), we avoid concerns over status, selection, 
and cultural norms as relevant group characteristics are evenly distributed among the residential 
colleges through random assignment. This random assignment is ideal for measuring general in-
group bias as the individual groups do not differ in any systematic manner but are “real” in the 
sense that their identities matter outside of the laboratory. This facet of our design allows us to be 
confident in our identification of preferences over general intergroup interactions rather than group 
specific prescriptions given random assignment to real identities or potentially artificial effects 
created by using minimal groups.  
To identify the effects of identity on the propensity to trust, we compare aggregate MAPS 
within treatments. A difference in the aggregate MAP for in-group and out-group matches in the 
risky dictator treatment is interpreted as participants having preferences over others’ earnings 
                                                 
8 These exceptions include students with disabilities and students whose parents graduated from a specific 






which are dependent on the identity of their counterpart. Similarly, a difference in aggregate MAP 
for in-group and out-group matches in the trust game provides a measure of how identity affects 
the propensity to trust. We subtract the aggregate MAP for in-group matches from the risky dictator 
game from that of the trust game to provide a measure of betrayal aversion towards the in-group. 
We compare this to the same measure for out-group matches to investigate how betrayal costs and 
their impact on the propensity to trust may differ by counterpart identity.  
We ran 9 sessions during the fall of 2016. We recruited participants from each of the 11 
residential colleges present at Rice with each session containing students from no more than three 
colleges. Sessions were run on the top floor of the Library in the Behavioral Research Lab created 
by Dr. Rick Wilson. The experiment was run on computers using ZTREE (Fishbacher, 2007) and 
each session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants earned an average of $16 including a 
$5 show-up fee.  We had 26 pairs in the first treatment across 4 sessions, 27 in the second treatment 
across 4 sessions, and 16 participants in the third treatment.  
3.4 Theory and Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses about aggregate (non-identity based) behavior in our treatments are based 
on the predictions and previous results provided by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004).  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will behave altruistically observed as a lower aggregate MAP in 
the risky dictator treatment relative to the decision problem treatment.  
The support for this hypothesis comes from a number of previous works on other regarding 
preferences. Perhaps the strongest support comes from the original work in which the author’s 
identify that individuals report a lower aggregate MAP in the risky dictator relative to the decision 
problem treatment (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). More general support comes from Charness 






and find that individuals tend to be more concerned with social welfare than reducing differences 
in relative earnings.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will be betrayal averse measured as a higher aggregate MAP in 
the trust game treatment relative to the risky dictator treatment.  
The support for this hypothesis comes from the original paper as well as the large body of 
research it has inspired. Papers in this framework have consistently identified that presence of 
betrayal aversion as measured as a difference in aggregate MAP between risky dictator and trust 
game treatments (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Hong and Bohnet, 2007; Aimone and Houser, 
2012).   
Taken together, these hypotheses simply state that we expect to replicate the original 
results. However, the purpose of this paper is to expand the original design to learn about how 
these preferences may be affected by identity. We expand our predictions to include identity using 
the theoretical framework outlined in Akerloff and Kranton (2000). 
We focus on how identity may prescribe what one ought to do in interpersonal interaction and 
how the cost of betrayal may vary by the group identity of others. This general model provides 
intuition in two important ways that will inform our hypotheses: 
First, One’s behavior can result in identity based utility gains and losses. Each identity comes 
with a set of social prescriptions and actions contrasting such prescriptions are likely to incur utility 
losses. Ignoring one’s group prescriptions can create feelings of disconnect from the group or 
shame for failing to be an ideal member of the group.  
Second, Other’s behavior can result in identity based utility gains and losses. Members of one’s 
group failing to conform to identity prescriptions or exhibiting behavior that excludes one from 






disconnect from the group and others failing to hold to a group ideal may decrease the overall 
value of membership to the group leading to identity based utility losses.  
 Of note, the intuition above presumes that membership to the group is a positive. If this is 
not the case, individuals may prefer actions that distance them from the group. We believe that 
this case is unlikely for our subjects for two reasons: 1. survey responses about their attachment to 
their residential colleges9, and 2. unlike membership to some other groups, individuals have the 
option to leave. Using this framework, we generate identity specific hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 3: P*, the probability of being paired with a counterpart who selected the 
equitable payoff, will be higher for in-group matches than out-group matches. We predict the 
proportion of individuals reciprocating trust will be higher among in-group decisions.  
 We assume that membership to a group contains the prescription that one should 
reciprocate trust if the other party is a member of one’s group. Thus, reciprocating trust strengthens 
membership to the group leading to identity based utility gains while failing to do so would incur 
identity based utility losses.   As a result, not reciprocating on the trust of one’s in-group incurs an 
additional cost that is not present in a similar decision with an out-group member. Since the costs 
(benefits) of betrayal are higher (lower) among one’s in-group, we expect participants to be less 
likely to betray when the betrayal affects a member of their in-group. 
 Hypothesis 4a: Individuals will act altruistically towards in-group matches.  Aggregate 
MAP for in-group matches in the risky dictator treatment will be lower than aggregate MAP from 
the decision problem treatment.      
                                                 







 A choice that results in higher earnings for the in-group carries additional benefits as it 
strengthens one’s group affiliation while simultaneously increasing the value of that membership 
through higher earnings for the group. Given utility is affected by the groups to which the 
individual belongs to, a choice that improves welfare for the group also increases welfare for the 
individual. 
Hypothesis 4b: Individuals will act inequality averse towards out-group matches.  
Aggregate MAP for out-group matches in the risky dictator treatment will be higher than aggregate 
MAP from the decision problem treatment.      
A choice that results in higher earnings for an out-group member weakens the decision 
maker’s group affiliation while simultaneously weakening the value of that group membership as 
an out-group’s status is raised. Given utility is affected by the groups to which the individual 
belongs to, a choice that improves welfare for the out-group makes the in-group relatively worse 
off which carries to the decision maker as well.   
Hypothesis 4c: Individuals in the risky dictator treatment will be more likely to prefer the 
gamble when they are matched with an in-group member. Aggregate MAP in the risky dictator 
treatment will be larger for out-group matches.  
This hypothesis can be viewed as the direct result of the two preceding hypotheses. Our 
model predicts that individuals have additional incentives to take the gamble with the in-group and 
to take the sure payment with the out-group.  Picking a lower MAP for an in-group match affirms 
one’s membership to the group and increases the in-groups overall welfare producing identity 
based utility gains while the opposite is true for out-group matches. Taken together, we expect the 
aggregate MAP for in-group matches in the risky dictator treatment to be lower than aggregate 






Hypothesis 5a: Individuals will act more betrayal averse towards their in-group as opposed 
to their out-group. 
Being betrayed incurs an emotional cost and this emotional cost is higher when the betrayal 
comes from a member of the in-group because of the loss of identity.  Put in real terms, being 
betrayed by someone who is close to you carries additional hurt: not only do you experience the 
betrayal itself, but additional costs arise from how it affects the relationship you share with the 
individual. You lose trust in the individual, and the group to which you both belong. Past 
interactions (memories) that were viewed positively may be masked by the betrayal and prevent 
the formation of future positive interactions. In our model, this is precisely the loss of identity 
predicted by individuals picking actions that exclude one of its group members.    
Hypothesis 5b: We expect individuals to act more betrayal averse towards their out-group 
as opposed to their in-group 
Individuals are more likely to pick actions that benefit the in-group because they strengthen 
their own group affiliation. In this way, individuals may be motivated to report lower maps for the 
in-group because it affirms their membership to the group. One possibility is that this motivation 
is already captured by the risky dictator treatment, but this decision requires trust.  Choosing to 
trust is a stronger action than those in the risky dictator treatment and therefore may exacerbate 
the observed difference in decisions between in-group and out-group matches.  
An alternative explanation for this hypothesis is that what constitutes a betrayal may be 
different for in-group and out group members. Previous experimental evidence involving in-group 
and out-group interactions provide tangential support for this claim. Researchers have shown that 
individuals are less likely to punish violated expectations when the violation comes from an in-






more likely to return to cooperation after a defection when they repeatedly interact with in-group 
members as opposed to out-group members (Li and Liu, 2017). In both of these examples, 
participants choose to avoid actions that would further reduce their group identity even though 
such behavior may be warranted and readily apparent in other circumstances.  
Taken together, we expect individuals to report lower aggregate MAPs towards in-group 
matches in the risky dictator treatment while bias could occur in either direction towards the in-
group in the trust game treatment. In line with previous work on trust and identity, we expect 
aggregate MAPs to be lower for in-group matches in both the risky dictator and trust game. Yet, 
it may be possible that betrayal aversion is lower towards the out-group even in this case as betrayal 
aversion requires evaluating MAPs relative to aggregate behavior in the risky dictator game.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Aggregate Results 
Before looking at identity based MAPs, we compare our aggregate results to previous work. Figure 
3.3 presents aggregate Map across all treatments and in the treatments where individuals make 
decisions with in-group and out-group matches, MAPs are pooled.  
 










































 To measure general risk aversion, we compare the aggregate MAP in the decision problem 
with the risk neutral point (p(15) = 0.29). On average, participants in our sample require a 46.88% 
chance of getting 15 tokens from the gamble before opting for the gamble over the sure option; 
this difference is statistically different from the risk neutral point of 29% (two-sided t-test, p<0.01). 
Compared to the original results (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004), our participants are more risk 
averse (46.88% vs. 37%) but not significantly so. 
 We compare the aggregate map in the risky dictator treatment with that in the decision 
problem to measure inequality aversion. Looking at figure 3.3, participants in the risky dictator 
treatment required a 46% chance of getting the payoff that provides 15 tokens before preferring 
the gamble. When we compare this to behavior in the decision problem we can see that on average 
participants are more likely to take the gamble when we introduced the second player (0.88%) but 
the difference is not statistically different from zero (two-sided t-test, p=0.78). We interpret this as 
participants having low concerns over relative earnings and efficiency in this environment. Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser (2004) similarly detect no difference in behavior between the decision problem 
and risky dictator game but their participants have an average MAP about 10% lower than our 
participants. 
 To test for general betrayal aversion, we compare aggregate behavior in the trust game with 
that in the risky dictator treatment. On average, participants require a 58.29% chance of getting 15 
tokens before preferring option B when another individual determines the outcome. Compared to 
the risky dictator treatment, participants are requiring a 12.3% higher chance when there is a 
chance that they are betrayed by another human; this difference is statistically significant (two-






paper but we reach the same qualitative conclusion that individuals are averse to learning they 
have been betrayed.  
 Overall, we confirm our first two hypotheses and replicate the pattern of findings found in 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). However, the main purpose of this paper is to understand how 
identity influences the decision to trust. Thus, we compare the decisions towards in-group and out-
group members in the risky dictator and trust game treatments. First, we compare the rate at which 
second movers reciprocate on trust towards first and second movers.   
3.5.2 Identity Results 
 
Figure 3.4: Second Mover Behavior by Counterpart Identity 
 
 
 Figure 3.4 presents the proportion of second movers choosing to reciprocate on the trust of 
their first mover by counterpart identity. Second movers reciprocate 61.5% of the time when 
matched to an out-group member and 53.8% when matched with an in-group member. We find 
































residential college but the difference is not significant (two-sided test of proportions, p=0.57). 
Directionally, this is consistent with our hypothesis albeit insignificantly so.  
 




 Turning to the behavior of first movers, Figure 3.5 presents the aggregate in-group and out-
group MAP in the risky dictator treatment.  The panel on the left presents the aggregate MAP 
while the panel on the right presents the results accounting for risk aversion. The left panel 
indicates our participants tend to show slight favoritism towards their in-group requiring a 2.85% 
higher chance of getting 15 tokens when they are matched with a member of another residential 
college. When we control for the aggregate level of risk aversion we find that individuals are 
actually more likely to take the gamble when an in-group member is introduced while the opposite 
holds true for out-group matches.  Directionally, this is in line with our hypotheses but the 


































































Figure 3.6: Average Minimal Acceptable Probability in the Betrayal Aversion Treatment by 
Counterpart Identity  
 
 
 Figure 3.6 presents the MAPs from the trust game by counterpart identity. The left panel 
displays the aggregate MAPs while the right presents the aggregate MAPs controlling for risk 
aversion and inequality aversion.  Looking at the overall in-group bias in trust (left panel), we find 
that on average individuals require about a 10% higher chance of having trust reciprocated before 
entering a trusting relationship with an out-group member as opposed to an in-group number (two-
sided t-test, p=0.06). The right panel presents the aggregate MAPs after controlling for risk 
aversion and other regarding preferences. We find that participants are significantly betrayal averse 
towards in-group and out-group members. This result adds to the extensive literature finding the 
presence of emotional costs associated with betrayal. When we compare the level of betrayal 
aversion between in-group and out-group matches, we find that the implied cost of betrayal is 









































































Table 3.1: Regression Estimates of Minimal Acceptable Probability   
 
 
 To analyze our data in further detail, we adopt an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
with individual MAPS as the dependent variable (table 3.1). In each specification, we drop 
observations from the decision problem allowing us to investigate the interaction of in-group 
pairing on MAP decisions. Across all three specifications, we can see there is a significant effect 
of having another individual decide the outcome of the gamble. We interpret the coefficient by 
comparing to the omitted category, the risky dictator treatment. Thus, on average participants are 
requiring a greater than 15% increase in the chance of getting the higher payoff before taking the 
gamble when it includes the potential for betrayal. We also find evidence that the difference in 
betrayal costs associated with identity are robust and statistically different from zero. Participants 
require on average a close to 10% increase in the probability of getting the good outcome before 
risking betrayal from an out-group member as opposed to an in-group member.  We find support 







 Our results provide mixed confirmation of our hypotheses. We find significant evidence 
that individuals prefer to enter trusting relationships with members of their own group and that 
individuals reciprocate trust more when paired with an in-group member. However, first movers 
tend not to display concerns over relative earnings that depend on the identity of their counterpart. 
Instead, we find that in-group bias in trusting behavior is driven by the presence of the possibility 
of betrayal. 
 In our theoretical framework, this result implies that individuals care more about how their 
own actions effect their group membership rather than the actions of others. One potential 
explanation for our results is the ability to divorce others actions from their group association: the 
choice of minimal acceptable probability cannot be divorced from group membership as it reflects 
one’s desire to conform to group prescriptions while another’s choice to betray can be as it may 
reflect on them instead of the group. Put another way, the identity-based cost of not trusting the 
in-group may be higher than the cost imposed by any realized betrayal.  
 An alternative explanation is participants hedging against a potential betrayal: any minimal 
acceptable probability besides 100% entails the possibility of betrayal and providing a lower 
minimal acceptable probability may be an attempt to pick an action that creates additional identity-
based utility gains that can offset any losses produced by a realized betrayal.  This would be akin 
to affirming one’s membership to a group by signaling desire to be a member of the group 
independent of negative treatment by other members.  
 A third potential explanation is that the cost of betrayal is higher when it comes from the 
out-group in the scenario we have studied. This would be the case in which the rarity of interactions 






related to the stakes of the trusting decision. When individuals think about betrayal from the in-
group they may gravitate towards larger betrayals (such as infidelity or slander) that are related to 
the degree of trust extended to in-group members whereas the same consideration for the out-group 
may be more analogous to the situation we studied in the lab. Put in real terms, this would be 
similar to being willing to overlook a small infraction from an in-group member but avoiding the 
same potential for betrayal from an out-group member.   
 Of note, Aimone and Houser (2012) provide an alternative explanation for behavior in this 
environment that is related to the interaction of beliefs and loss aversion. The authors suggest that 
participant’s choice of MAP could be affected by beliefs through the desire to avoid finding out 
that beliefs are incorrect. For example, if a participant believes their in-group is 70% trustworthy 
but is risk neutral and prefers to take the gamble whenever P*=0.29, then they may report a MAP 
higher than p=0.29 to hedge against the possibility of finding out that less than 70% of their in-
group is trustworthy. We believe these concerns could only strengthen our results: beliefs towards 
the in-group tend to be biased upwards (Falk and Zehnder, 2013) suggesting that participant’s 
MAPs toward the in-group would be inflated upwards. Thus, if anything, our results regarding the 
costs of betrayal from the in-group would be strengthened by this concern.  
 Before concluding, we discuss how our results may generalize to other groups. As part of 
our procedure, individuals reported the strength of their affiliation to the residential college along 
a number of dimensions. We find no evidence that any of these measures predict discrimination 
towards the in-group. However, we believe this result may be an artefact of the identities we are 
using: residential colleges creates variation in group identity but are housed under the shared 
identity of being Rice students, which may limit differentiation between the in-group and out-






would only be stronger with other groups. As groups become more socially distant, we predict the 
difference in MAPs would as well. However, using other groups introduce a host of other concerns 
including beliefs about trustworthiness, status, and group specific norms. The strength of our 
design lies in its ability to avoid these concerns but trusting relationships outside the lab depend 
deeply on these concerns and researchers should take care in considering how these additional 
concerns may affect the propensity to trust. Although neither Hong and Bohnet (2007) nor Bohnet 
et al. (2008) includes explicit intergroup interaction, they provide evidence that the strength of 
various concerns related to the propensity to trust vary by social group and culture implying that 
specific group norms matter in this context.  
 This paper is the first to investigate how the identity of one’s counterpart effects betrayal 
aversion. We exploit random real group assignment to dormitories at Rice to avoid concerns about 
status and selection. We find that participants have little to no preference over other’s earnings 
whether they are members of the in-group or the out-group, but that participants are betrayal averse 
towards both. Additionally, we find that the level of betrayal aversion is significantly higher 
towards the out-group.  
 In a time when tribalism dominates political discourse and divisive lines are often drawn 
between groups, we believe studying the determinants of intergroup hostility to be of utmost 
importance. Our results suggest that individuals are motivated by the emotional rather than 
monetary aspects of the decision to trust. Policy makers interested in reducing intergroup tension 
should focus on shielding trustors from potential emotional costs rather than highlight the potential 
monetary gains from trust. Our results suggest that interaction with the out-group is a necessary 






focus on insuring individuals from potential betrayals or encouraging regular intergroup 
interaction to reduce the weight placed on the actions of individual out-group members.  
 Future work on this topic should extend our work to real social groups and should focus 
on separating out the various explanations for our results. Although our work provides a necessary 
first step by isolating general intergroup behavior, additional research is necessary to understand 
how our results may vary with specific group attributes including status and norms. Researcher 
should focus on groups with varied status and antagonism to understand whether different 
strategies for encouraging trust are necessary for different social groups. Similarly, while we have 
identified that identity-based differences in the perceived cost of betrayal are an important factor 
in the decision to trust, we have not identified why this is the case. We discuss how various 
explanations may be consistent with our results but future work is necessary to understand the 
importance of volume of interactions, the relative weights of one’s versus another’s actions in 
terms of identity-based utility effects, and whether our results are robust to situations that vary the 





















 Although the gender gap in wages has shrunk considerably in the last 50 years, researchers 
have noted significant vertical segregation across genders (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Bertrand and 
Hallock, 2001). Historical accounts seeking to explain the persistence of gender differences in 
labor market outcomes focus on differences in skills, different preferences for working, and 
discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Polachek, 1981; Goldin and Rouse, 2000). These accounts may 
explain a small part of the gender disparity, but they do not adequately account for its size and 
robustness (Blau and Khan, 2017).  
 Behavioral economists have begun to explore alternative explanations for the persistence 
of gender differences in labor market outcomes. For example, Babcock et al. (2003) find that 
women are over twice as likely as men to be apprehensive about negotiating for higher wages. As 
a result, they find that women ask for and receive 30% less than men when negotiating. Vesterlund 
et al. (2007) investigate an additional explanation in the form of competitive preferences. They 
find that men are over twice as likely to opt for a competitive payment scheme even though their 
performance is statistically indistinguishable from that of their female counterparts. Later work by 
Buser et al. (2012,2014) finds that competitive preferences predict choice of major and as a result 
occupation. These findings in tangent with the finding that differences in occupational choice are 
the single largest contributor to the current gender wage gap (Blau and Khan, 2017) imply that 
behavioral considerations may explain the persistence of the gender differences in labor market 
outcomes.  
 More recently, Babcock et al. (2017) investigate a potential alternative explanation by 






such tasks as tasks that need to be completed in an office but do not increase the chances of the 
individual being promoted. Examples of such tasks include making coffee or copies, taking notes 
during a meeting or, within academia, serving on committees and advising students. Such tasks 
can be viewed as an individually produced public good that offers benefit to all but less so to its 
producer as they must pay the cost of production. Providing anecdotal and empirical evidence, 
Babcock et al. (2017) find that women are more likely to be asked and to accept such tasks in a 
number of industries including academia, banking and other mid-level jobs (Misra et al., 2012; 
Mitchell and Hesli, 2013; Benschop and Doorewaard, 1998; De Pater et al., 2010). To understand 
this pattern of behavior, Babcock and her co-authors (2017) take to the laboratory to study the 
allocation of tasks that individuals want to be completed but prefer another individual to complete.  
 The results from the laboratory confirm the impressions provided by previous empirical 
work. Across 10 rounds, women volunteered to complete greater than one additional low 
promotability task. Although this may not appear to be a large difference, it is important to note 
that this translates to a greater than 10% difference in the propensity to complete tasks with low 
promotability. In a follow-up to the first experiment, the authors investigate if there are any gender 
differences in how managers allocate requests to complete low promotability tasks and find a 
reinforcing effect in that over ten rounds, women receive an average of two additional requests to 
volunteer to complete the low promotability task. Taken together, women are more likely to be 
asked and to volunteer to complete low promotability tasks. Babcock et al. argue that this 
difference could explain a significant portion of vertical gender segregation through lower 
opportunities for promotion.  
 To build on this result, we explore the mechanism underlying the observed gender gap in 






completion into the experimental design used in Babcock et al. (2017) to test the importance of 
gendered beliefs in this context. The intuition behind this addition is that real differences in 
opportunity costs should create an implication of who ought to volunteer that is stronger than those 
potentially implied by gender norms. Put another way, we hypothesize that the introduction of 
explicit opportunity cost differences will results in common recognition of who should complete 
the low promotability task. Introducing this cost differential will provide our experiment with a 
comparable structure to the hierarchies present in most office environments, mimicking the 
standard that workers in a large office setting are paid differentially based on their abilities (Oi and 
Idson 1999). We believe these wage differences may explicitly signal differing opportunity costs 
for performing tasks, providing workers with a tacit understanding of whose time is more valuable 
and should be devoted to more promotable tasks. We expect to find that introducing a similar cost-
based formal hierarchy for performing low promotability tasks may reduce the volunteering gap 
between genders, simultaneously exposing and suppressing a potential implicit gender-based cost 
structure that may be driving Babcock et al.’s (2017) original results.  
  We find mixed results with regards to our hypothesis. In our baseline treatment, we fail to 
replicate the original results.  We find a gender gap that is insignificant and close to 80% smaller 
than the original study suggesting that our sample may be inherently different from the original 
study. When we introduce heterogeneous costs of volunteering, we find a gap similar in magnitude 
to the original study but much larger than our baseline treatment. We find that there is substantial 
differences across cost types with the gender gap being half as a large among low cost individuals 
relative to their high part counterparts. However, when we ask participants to act as managers who 






explicit cost differences removes the previously observed gender gap in requests received and, as 
a result, the gender gap in low promotability task completion.   
 Our results suggest that the empirically observed gender gap in low promotability task 
completion may be driven, at least in part, by beliefs that differ across gender. The introduction of 
explicit cost differences in task completion is salient to participants producing a large difference 
in task completion across cost types. This suggests that the presence of hierarchy in office settings 
may alleviate gender differences in low promotability task completion across hierarchical levels. 
However, we find that among high cost individuals the gender gap is even larger than the original 
study suggesting that the impact of introducing hierarchy into an office setting may not alleviate 
gender differences within hierarchical levels. On the other hand, we find that the introduction of 
explicit cost differences in the presence of managers effectively eliminates any gender difference 
in requests received and, as a result, any gender differences in task completion. This result suggests 
that reminding manager of the opportunity costs of their employees (which increase with low 
promotability task completion) could effectively eliminate the gender gap in low promotability 
task completion.  
4.2 Literature Review  
 Although our study is framed in terms of the completion of low promotability tasks, the 
experimental game we use was originally introduced as the “Volunteer’s dilemma” (VD) by 
Andreas Diekmann (1985). The name refers to the situation the experimental game represents in 
which individuals must simultaneously decide whether to sacrifice to produce a good that benefits 
everyone. Similar to the low promotability task scenarios described above, the volunteer’s 
dilemma is characterized by a case in which everyone prefers for a collective good to be produced 






household chores (Weesie, 1993) and the decision to produce open source software (Johnson, 
2002). However, others have pointed out much more extreme versions including bystanders calling 
the police when a crime is witnessed by multiple individuals (Rosenthal, 2015), and a soldier 
diving on a live grenade to save their fellow soldiers (Murnighan et al., 1993). 
 Our work focuses on a particular version of the VD in which individuals face asymmetric 
costs of volunteering. Diekmann (1984) provides a game theoretic analysis of this case finding the 
counter-intuitive prediction that the propensity to volunteer is positively related to the cost of 
volunteering. Put in context, this would imply that in a situation in which a group of bystanders 
witness a drowning man, individuals who cannot swim would be most likely to try and save the 
individual (Diekmann, 1984). Instead, Diekmann (1984) suggests a more plausible solution 
suggested by Schelling’s (1980) concept of a prominent solution in which the universal recognition 
of who ought to volunteer leads higher rates of volunteering among low cost individuals.  This 
prediction may be consistent with the results of Babcock et al. (2017) if gender norms produce a 
focal point of who should volunteer in the absence of other signals. If this is the case, then the 
introduction of asymmetric costs of volunteering should alleviate at least part of the gender gap as 
long as explicit cost differences are more salient than gender norms.  
 However, other experimental work suggests the possibility of types of individuals that 
differ in the propensity to volunteer. Bergstrom et al. (2015) finds that between 15% and 36% of 
individuals are the type that prefer to volunteer as evidenced by a decision to volunteer before 
other players have an opportunity to do so. Combined with the suggestion by Babcock et al. (2017) 
that the observed gender gap in volunteering may be the result of gender differences in preferences, 
our proposed treatment of explicit cost differences may be ineffective at alleviating the previously 






 Yet, other experimental evidence supports the relevance of focal points in the VD context. 
Przepiorka and Diekmann (2018) show experimental evidence of high rates of coordination in 
circumstances where there is a “strong” member of each group that faces lower costs of 
volunteering. Consistent with this result and most similar to our own work, Healy and Pate (2018) 
find high rates of volunteering among low cost individuals in an asymmetric volunteer’s dilemma. 
Although their work is not explicitly focused on gender, the authors find no evidence of a gender 
gap in volunteering lending support to the possibility of gender norms serving as a weak focal 
point (Healy and Pate, 2018). Other suggestive evidence comes from Babcock et al. (2017) in 
which no gender gap in volunteering appears when experimental sessions only involve a single 
gender.     
 We seek to further this body work by introducing asymmetric costs into the treatments used 
in Babcock et al. (2017). Although our introduction of asymmetric costs is similar to the 
incomplete information treatment in Healy and Pate’s (2018) work, there are important 
differences. Beyond the use of different parameters, we study the pattern of requesting behavior 
in the presence of asymmetric costs which, to our knowledge, has not been previously studied. Our 
work contributes to the literature on volunteering behavior in an asymmetric VD setting, but is the 
first to investigate how asymmetric costs effects requesting behavior. Beyond this, our work is 
explicitly focused on understanding the mechanism underlying the gender gap in Babcock et al. 
(2017) by investigating how the introduction of asymmetric costs may moderate its magnitude. 
4.3 Experimental Design 
4.3.1 Treatment 1: Symmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma 
 Treatment 1 is a replication of the first treatment from Babcock et al. (2017). After 






for ten rounds. Participants are told that in each round they will be randomly assigned to a group 
of 3 with the condition that they cannot be re-matched with a member of their group from the 
previous round.  In an individual round, participants are endowed with a single token and have 120 
seconds to choose whether or not to invest in a group account10. As soon as a group member 
invests, the round ends and each subject receives an additional token. However, the participant 
who invested must pay a cost of 0.75 tokens. Thus, in the event that any group member invests, 
one group member earns 1.25 tokens while the other group members receive 2 tokens. If no group 
member invests during the 120 second period, each subject earns their endowment, 1 token, for 
that round. If two participants choose to invest simultaneously, one of them will be randomly 
selected to invest and pay the cost11. This incentive scheme captures the characteristics of a low 
promotability task as it’s a task that makes everyone better off when completed but each individual 
prefers not to be the individual to invest. At the conclusion of each round, subjects are informed 
of their earnings and if any, but not which, member of their group invested during the round. 
Following the experimental conditions, subjects complete an incentivized risk measure and an ex-
post survey and are paid their earnings from the experiment in private.  
4.3.2 Treatment 2: Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma  
 Treatment 2 is identical to treatment 1 with one important exception, the introduction of 
heterogeneous costs of investment. At the start of the experiment, participants are told that each 
participant is randomly assigned a cost of investing that is either high (0.85) or low (0.65) and that 
each participant’s assigned cost will remain the same across all ten rounds. Costs are assigned such 
                                                 
10 This language is chosen to be neutral and avoid priming subjects (Babcock et al., 2017) 
11 Although subjects are informed of the procedure in the case of a tie, barring server delays, the computer 






that each participant has an equal chance of being assigned either cost but with no restrictions on 
the distribution of costs in any session. The method in which costs are assigned is explained to 
participants, but participants are only aware of their own costs. Thus, similar to the incomplete 
information treatment in Healy and Pate (2018), participants do not know if their group is 
comprised of individuals with the same or different costs. In an individual round, participants are 
endowed with a single token and have 120 seconds to choose whether or not to invest. As soon as 
a group member invests, the round ends and each subject receives an additional token. However, 
the participant who invested must pay their cost (either 0.65 or 0.85). Thus, in the event that the 
low promotability task is completed, one group member earns 1.15 or 1.35 tokens while the other 
group members receive 2 tokens. The rest of the experimental conditions for treatment 2 are 
identical to treatment 1.  
4.3.3 Treatment 3: Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma with Managers 
 This treatment is identical to treatment 3 of Babcock et al. (2017) except that we include 
heterogeneous costs of investment. After providing informed consent, participants in this session 
have a photo taken of them that will be used during the experiment. Participants are assigned a 
cost like in treatment 2 and told that they will be randomly placed into groups of 4 in each of ten 
rounds. However, the conditions of re-matching are slightly different in this treatment. In the first 
5 rounds, participants will be matched into groups such that they will not be re-matched with a 
group member from any previous round. In the remaining five rounds, matching follows the 
procedure from the first two treatments. Participants are told that in each round their group of 4 
will contain a “red player” and three “green players.” Red players cannot invest in the group 






 Requests are solicited using the strategy method: prior to learning the identity of the red 
player, each participant chooses a group member to request in the event that they are selected as 
the red player in their group. Prior to the investment stage, each participant views the photos of 
their three other group members as well as their costs and selects the one they would like to request 
to complete the task in the event they are selected as the red player in their group. After each 
participant makes their request, the red player is chosen at random and each subject is informed of 
their role as well as the group member who was requested to invest. Although the entire group 
knows which group member was requested, the request is non-binding and imposes no monetary 
cost on a subject who chooses to ignore it. Following the request stage, the experiment proceeds 
identically to treatment 2 except that the red player only sees as a waiting screen as they cannot 
invest. The same payment structure applies to the red player who earns 2 tokens if any green player 
invests, and 1 token otherwise. 
4.3.4 Incentivized Risk Measure and Ex-post Survey 
 Across all three treatments, relevant individual preferences and demographics are elicited 
after the completion of round 10 of the game. Risk preferences are measured using Eckel and 
Grossman (2008) risk elicitation method. In the elicitation, participants select among 1 of 6 50-50 
gambles that each increase in variance with the first 5 increasing in expected value as well. To 
incentivize participant’s responses to this elicitation, one subject in each session is selected to 
receive payment from their Eckel-Grossman choice. Altruism is measured using the procedures 
set forth by Bekkers and Wilhelm (2010). Social risk preferences are measured by the Domain-






tested by using “The Big-Five Trait Taxonomy” by John and Srivastava (1999). Lastly, subjects 
respond Zuckerman’s sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman, 2007). 
 Each of the treatments we ran were conducted in ZTREE (Fischbacher, 2007) in the ERL 
at Texas A&M University. Subjects were recruited from the ERL’s subject pool using ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015) and no session lasted longer than an hour and a half. Because of the nature of the 
research question and Babcock et al.’s (2017) results regarding single sex session special attention 
was paid to recruiting an equal number of men and women for each session. Over the 14 sessions 
ran across the three treatments, the proportion of women in each session ranged from 40-60%. 
Although gender was never explicitly mentioned, subjects could see the other participants in their 
session prior to the start of the experiment. We ran 5 sessions of treatment 1 and 3 sessions of 
treatment 2 in the fall of 2016 producing 120 and 72 subjects respectively. In the fall of 2018, we 
ran 6 sessions of treatment 3 producing 120 subjects. In treatment 1 and 2, average earnings were 
$14.30 including a $5 show-up fee. Average earnings did not differ significantly across the two 
treatments. In treatment 3, average earnings were $20.30 including a $10 show-up fee12.   
4.4 Theory and Hypothesis 
4.4.1 Symmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma (Treatment 1) 
 Our predictions about behavior across the three treatments is drawn from the game 
theoretic work of Diekmann (1984, 1985) and the results of Babcock et al. (2017). We first 
consider the general game theoretic Nash equilibrium predictions for our baseline treatment 
                                                 
12 Participants earned “tokens” during the experiment and were told that tokens would be converted to cash at the 






(treatment 1) where subjects are in groups of three and must choose between volunteering and 
earning 0.25 tokens (the 1 token bonus minus the 0.75 token cost of volunteering) or not 
volunteering and earning either 0 or 1 tokens based on the behavior of other group members. Given 
that payoffs for one of the options depend on the actions of other group members, it is unsurprising 
that an optimal strategy depends on the behavior of other group members. Drawing from the game 
theoretic solutions provided by Diekmann (1985) and the application by Babcock et al. (2017), we 
identify three Nash equilibria. The most socially efficient but least equitable solution is an 
asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which one group member volunteers 100% of the 
time while the other two group members never volunteer leading to a successful investment in 
each round. The second equilibrium is a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which 
each subject volunteers 13.4% of the time leading to an expected investment 35% of the time. The 
final equilibrium is an asymmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which one group member 
never volunteers while the other two group members each volunteer 25% of the time. This pattern 
of behavior would lead to a predicted overall investment rate of 44%13.  
 To select among these three predictions, we look at previous experimental results. In the 
study that is directly comparable to our first treatment, Babcock et al. (2017) find substantial 
evidence that individuals volunteer more than predicted by the symmetric equilibrium. The authors 
find that groups succeed in producing the collective good 85.4% of the time—a number much 
larger than each mixed-strategy equilibrium but much lower than the pure-strategy equilibrium. 
                                                 
13 Following Babcock et al. (2017), if we account for ties than the rate of volunteering become 23.2% in the 
symmetric mixed equilibrium and 40% in the asymmetric mixed equilibrium predicting the good will be produced 






We expect to produce a pattern of results similar to Babcock et al. (2017) forming our first 
hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: Groups will secure an investment less than the asymmetric pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium predicts, but at a much higher rate than that predicted by the mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibria. 
 We now draw predictions about how identity will affect the rate of volunteering. We expect 
to replicate the results from treatment 1 of Babcock et al. (2017) in which the authors find that 
women volunteer significantly more often than men. The authors suggest a variety of mechanisms 
that could drive this prediction including women having greater other-regarding preferences 
(Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) or that women are more interested in appearing agreeable 
(Braiker, 2002). We do not take a stance on the mechanism driving behavior in this treatment but 
do predict a pattern of results similar to the original study leading to our second hypothesis.      
 Hypothesis 2: In line with the results of Babcock et al. (2017), Women will volunteer more 
than men.  
4.4.2 Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma (Treatment 2) 
 To draw hypotheses about how the introduction of heterogeneous costs of volunteering 
will effect behavior, we return to the game theoretic analysis of Diekmann (1984).  Diekmann’s 
theoretical work produces a counter-intuitive prediction that in the presence of asymmetric costs, 
lower cost individuals will be less likely to volunteer. We find this prediction to intractable given 
its unrealistic implications such as an individual who can’t swim volunteering to save a drowning 
man. In addition, we find this prediction unattractive as previous experimental evidence 
(Diekmann, 1984; Healy and Pate, 2018) consistently find a much higher rate of volunteering 






solution” (Schelling, 1960) more attractive. In direct support of this alternative prediction, 
Przepiorka and Diekmann (2018) find high rates of volunteering among low cost individuals and 
high overall rates of investment in a VD setting with exactly one low cost group member in each 
group leading to our third hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3: Low cost individuals will volunteer at a much higher rate than their high 
cost-counterparts. 
 Turning to how we expect the introduction of asymmetric costs to effect the previously 
observed gender gap, we consider the theoretical work of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). Akerloff 
and Kranton (2010) provide anecdotal evidence of the relevance of gender norms in behavior by 
highlighting the plight of female lawyers who feel caught between meeting the norms associated 
with being a women and those associated with being a lawyer. Similarly, the inclusion of identity 
in the standard utility function can aid in the explanation of the gender gap found in Babcock et al. 
(2017). If being a woman prescribes increased engagement in low promotability tasks, then the 
gender gap may be explained by identity-driven utility differences. Women may experience a 
utility loss from not volunteering, while the opposite is true for men. This is also consistent with 
Selten’s (1960) focal point theorem if the symmetric game leads to an identity-driven focal point 
where women are expected to volunteer. We predict that the introduction of heterogeneous costs 
of volunteering may alleviate this gender difference in expectations and beliefs about the need to 
volunteer through providing an even stronger focal point.  In line with this prediction, Healy and 
Pate (2018) find no gender gap in volunteering in their version of the asymmetric VD leading to 
our fourth hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 4: Introducing heterogeneous costs will alleviate the previously found gender 






4.4.3 Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma with Managers (Treatment 3) 
  Our hypotheses regarding the third treatment are driven largely by the logic used to predict 
behavior in the second treatment. We theorize that the observed gender gap in requests found in 
Babcock et al. (2017) is driven by gender serving as a weak focal point. We predict that the 
asymmetric costs acts as a stronger focal point which will drive manager’s behavior leading to our 
fifth hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 5: Managers will request low cost rather than high costs individuals to 
volunteer.  
 Given that costs are randomly assigned, it follows logically that there will be less 
opportunities where managers will be choosing among gender as opposed to cost14 and as a result 
that the gender gap in requests received will be much smaller leading to our final hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 6: Giving managers information about the heterogeneous costs of their 
employees will alleviate the previously found gender gap in requests to complete a low 
promotability tasks.   
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Symmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma (Treatment 1) 
 Overall, we are unable to replicate the results of Babcock et al. (2017). We find that on 
average women volunteer 3.09 times over ten rounds while men volunteer 2.89 times producing a 
difference that is insignificant (two-sided t-test, p=0.67) and roughly one fifth of the original gap. 
Figure 4.1 presents the probability of volunteering split by gender over ten rounds. Unlike Babcock 
et al. (2017), we do not find clear separation in the probability of volunteering across gender and 
                                                 







find rates of volunteering that are close to the midpoint of volunteering between men and women. 
Our participants manage to have at least one group member volunteer 89.5% of the time, a rate 
that is higher than the original study.   
 
Figure 4.1: Probability of Volunteering over Ten Rounds (Treatment 1) 
 
 

















































 Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of total volunteering over ten rounds. Consistent with 
Babcock et al. (2017), we find that the distribution of volunteering among males is skewed left 
while the distribution for women is more normal. The rate of full abstention from volunteering is 
close to double for men relative to women, a gap that is larger than the one found in the original 
paper. However, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are drawn from 
the same population (Kolomogrov-Smirnov test, p=0.48).   
 
Table 4.1: Probit of Volunteering (Treatment 1) 
  
 
 Taking a regression approach to our data, table 4.1 displays the results of a probit analysis 
predicting the probability of volunteering as a function of gender, round, and risk preferences. 
Standard errors are clustered at the subject level to account for the presence of repeated observation 
of the same individual.  Our model has little predictive power with regards to volunteering behavior 
and we see a small positive but insignificant effect of being a female on the probability of 
volunteering. Overall, with the exclusion of the higher rate of non-volunteering among males, we 







4.5.2 Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma (Treatment 2) 
 
Figure 4.3: Probability of Volunteering by Cost Type (Treatment 2) 
 
 
 Before investigating the gender gap in volunteering in treatment 2, we check whether the 
introduction of asymmetric costs impacted volunteering behavior. We repeat the same analysis 
from treatment 1 splitting the data by cost type instead of gender. Looking at the probability of 
volunteering across rounds (Figure 4.3), there is clear separation across cost types with low cost 
participants being, on average, over twice as likely to volunteer relative to their high cost 
counterparts. This separation translates to large gap in overall volunteering with low cost 
individuals volunteering an average of 3.6 times over ten rounds while their high costs counterparts 
only volunteer an average of 1.6 times. This difference is significant and almost twice as large in 
magnitude as the gender gap found in the original study (two-sided t-test, p<0.001).  Overall, our 



































of volunteering in the first half of the experiment (92.5% vs. 74.2%). This rate is slightly lower 
than the original study but the pattern of decay over rounds is similar. 
 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Total Volunteering by Cost Type (Treatment 2) 
 
 
 Turning to the distribution of total volunteering over ten rounds (Figure 4.4), we see a 
pattern that looks similar to the distribution from treatment 1 from Babcock et al. (2017) except 
that it is based on cost type instead of gender. High cost individuals exhibit a distribution that is 
skewed left while low cost individuals exhibit a significantly different distribution that is more 
normal (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.002).  On this surface, this lends support to our hypothesis 
that gender norms serve to create a weak focal point in the absence of other signals.  
 Given our hypotheses and the results from treatment 1, we expect a similar lack of gender 
gap in treatment 2. Figure 4.5 presents the probability of volunteering across rounds split by gender 
but pooled across cost type. There is now a larger difference in the probability of volunteering 
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experiment progresses. This difference translates to a larger overall difference in volunteering than 
in treatment 1 with men volunteering 2.3 times on average across ten rounds while women 
volunteer an average of 3.2 times. Although we now find a gap that is similar in magnitude to the 
original study, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that there is not a significant gender difference 
because our sample is about half that of the original study (two-sided t-test, p=0.13). 
 
Figure 4.5: Probability of Volunteering by Gender (Treatment 2) 
 
 
 Looking at the distribution of volunteering over 10 rounds (Figure 4.6), we find that the 
gender disparity in abstention from volunteering is even larger than in treatment 1 or Babcock et 
al. (2017) with men being over three times as likely to never volunteer across ten rounds. Similar 
to treatment 1 and the original work, we find again that the distribution for men is skewed left 
while the distribution for women is more normal. Although the difference in the distribution is 
more pronounced, we are still unable to reject the claim that the samples are drawn from the same 
































much closer to those from the original study suggesting that our treatment was not only ineffective 
in reducing the gender gap but may have exacerbated it when considering the results relative to 
those from treatment 1. However, it is possible that the overall results mask heterogeneity in the 
interaction of gender and cost type. 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Total Volunteering by Gender (Treatment 2) 
  
 
 Figure 4.7 presents the probability of investing in each round split by gender among low 
cost individuals. The rates of volunteering for both men and women are relatively high and overlap 
often, but the probability of volunteering is still higher among women. We find that, on average, 
across ten rounds low cost men volunteer 3.3 times while their female counterparts volunteer 4 
times (two sided t-test, p=0.34). Relative to the original study, the gap is about two-thirds as large 
suggesting that our treatment was effective in encouraging greater equality in volunteering among 

























(treatment 1) suggesting that the introduction of asymmetric costs may have exacerbated the 
gender gap in volunteering.  
 
Figure 4.7: Probability of Volunteering among Low Cost Subjects by Gender (Treatment 2) 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Distribution of Total Volunteering among Low Cost Subjects by Gender 


















































 Looking at the distribution of overall volunteering across ten rounds (figure 4.8), we can 
again see a pronounced gender difference in abstaining from volunteering with only male low cost 
participants ever choosing to forgo volunteering in at least one round. However, the overall 
distribution for both men and women appear relatively normal suggesting that our treatment may 
have altered the way in which the gender gap in volunteering manifests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, p=0.91). Overall, we conclude the relative to the original study, the introduction of 
heterogeneous costs shrunk the gender gap in volunteering among low cost participants.  
 
Figure 4.9: Probability of Volunteering among High Cost Subjects by Gender (Treatment 2) 
 
 
 Turning to behavior among high cost participants, we see a stark contrast across genders 
in the probability of investing (Figure 9).  With the exception of round 4, high cost women are 
always more likely to volunteer and this difference translates into high cost women volunteering 
at 3 times the rate of high cost men. Over ten rounds, women volunteer an average of 2.24 times 






























p<0.05). The difference within gender among cost types is significant for both men and women 
(two-sided t-test, p<0.001 and p=0.01 respectively) but the magnitude of the adjustment is much 
greater for men.   
 












 Looking at the distribution of overall volunteering (figure 4.10), we observe that the large 
gender gap is again driven by the difference in full abstention from volunteering. High cost males 
are over 3 times as likely to never volunteer and over two-thirds of high cost males choose to never 
volunteer. Taken together, these results suggest that our treatment exacerbated the gender gap in 
volunteering among those that should not volunteer suggesting a particularly worrisome pattern in 
which top-earning females may be more prone to the negative effects of low promotability task 




























promotability task completion may become even larger as the costs of completion increase creating 
an even larger divide in labor market outcomes.  
 To disentangle the effects of cost and gender, we return to our probit analysis with the 
addition of both gender and type dummies (table 4.2). Consistent with the original paper, we find 
that across all specifications there is a decay in volunteering over time. In the first specification, 
we can see that the effect of being a female on the probability of investing is almost identical to 
the one found in the original study and that the effect of being assigned a low cost is almost twice 
as strong as the gender effect. When we allow the gender effect to be moderated by cost type 
(specification 2), we see the much larger gender effect among high cost individuals. Lastly, in the 
third specification we see that the greater an individual’s risk tolerance, the less likely they are to 
volunteer. Additionally, we see that the gender effect is partly driven by differences in risk 
tolerance. Overall, we conclude that the introduction of heterogeneous costs did not shrink the 
previously observed gender gap and may have even exacerbated it. However, this analysis only 
captures the effect of introducing heterogeneous costs on the supply of low-promotability task 
completion. In the final section of analysis, we look at how the introduction of heterogeneous costs 
effects the previously observed gender gap in requests to complete low-promotability tasks. 
 






4.5.3 Asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma with Managers (Treatment 3) 
 In the final treatment, we introduce the concept of managers and ask participants to pick  
other members of their group to request to volunteer. Surprisingly, unlike the original study, we 
see a large drop in the rate of volunteering. Across ten rounds, groups manage to have at least one 
member volunteer 68.5% of the time and the rate does not differ significantly across rounds. In 
comparison, groups succeed in completing the task 93.5% of the time in the original study. We 
find that 62.3% of requests are accepted and the rate of acceptance differs only slightly by gender. 
This rate is lower than the 65.5% acceptance rate from the original study but the major difference 
across the two samples is among those who volunteer without being requested as only 9% of our 
participants do so while 14% do so in the original study15. Additionally, the rate of accepting 
requests does not differ significantly across cost types with low cost and high cost individuals 
accepting 63% and 60% of the time respectively. 
 
Figure 4.11: Distribution of Total Strategy Method Requests Received by Cost Type  
                                                 


























 Similar to our analysis to treatment 2, we first investigate whether the introduction of 
heterogeneous costs had an effect on requests and volunteering behavior. Figure 4.11 presents the 
distribution of strategy method requests received over ten rounds by cost type.  The difference is 
stark: both samples are relatively normal but the degree of overlap is minimal (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, p<0.001). Managers requested low cost individuals to volunteer an average of 14.9 
times while they only request high cost individuals to volunteer an average of 5.6 times (two-sided 
t-test, p<0.0001). Looking to how this affects the rates of volunteering by cost type (figure 4.12), 
we see that similar to treatment 2 the distribution of volunteering among high cost individuals is 
skewed left while that of low cost individuals is more normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, 
p=0.001). The rate of abstention from volunteering is lower than in treatment 2, and the overall 
gap in volunteering is smaller but still significant. Low cost individuals volunteer 3 times on 
average across ten rounds while high cost individuals only volunteer 1.6 times (two-sided t-test, 
p<0.0001). Similar to treatment 2, our pattern of results suggest that the introduction of 
heterogeneous costs to participants was salient.  
 



























 After confirming that our treatment was effective, we turn to the real question of interest 
in how the introduction of different costs affected the previously observed gender gap in request 
received. The distribution of requests received (Figure 4.13) is bi-modal capturing the divisive 
requesting behavior among cost types. Yet, within gender, we see little difference across the 
distribution of total requests received (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p=0.902). On average, we detect 
only a small difference in requests received as women receive 10.2 requests while men receive 9.8 
requests across ten rounds (Two-sided t-test, p=0.69). Thus, we conclude that the introduction of 
asymmetric costs was effective in culling the previously observed gender gap in requests received 
to volunteer. 
 
Figure 4.13:  Distribution of Total Strategy Method Requests Received by Gender   
 
 
 To see how this translates into actual task completion, figure 4.14 presents the distribution 
of total volunteering over ten rounds by gender. The distributions for each gender have a slight 
























p=0.965). Across 10 rounds women volunteer an average of 2.4 times while men volunteer an 
average of 2.1 times (two-sided t-test, p=0.39). This difference is driven by a larger but 
insignificant difference among high cost individuals as high cost women volunteer an average of 
3.3 times while their male counterparts only volunteer 2.7 times over ten rounds (two-sided t-test, 
p=0.19). Overall, it appears that the effect of introducing heterogeneous costs on the gender gap 
in requests received carried over to task completion.  
 
Figure 4.14: Distribution of Total Volunteering by Gender (Treatment 3) 
 
 
 As a final method of analysis, we repeat the probit analysis from treatment 3.  Confirming 
our earlier analysis, across all 3 specifications we detect no effect of gender. Instead, we find that 
the only variable with predictive power is whether the participant is low or high cost. Taken 
together, we conclude that in line with our hypothesis that the introduction of heterogeneous costs 































 We find mixed confirmation of our hypotheses. We are unable to replicate the results of 
Babcock et al. (2017) on which this study is based. However, we find an interesting pattern of 
results when we introduce asymmetric costs into the previously studied environments. Relative to 
our baseline treatment, our results imply that introducing explicit cost differences exacerbates the 
previously found gender gap in low promotability task completion rather than alleviating it as we 
had hypothesized. We find that the effect of costs differences differs across gender with men being 
much more responsive to a shift in their cost of completing the task. The resulting effect is that we 
find a smaller gap relative to the original paper among low-cost participants but a larger gap among 
high-cost participants. In some sense, this may be worse than finding a null effect as our results 
imply that the previously observed gap may become even larger as the costs of low promotability 
task completion increase. This suggest the potential for a much a larger gender disparity in labor 
market outcomes due to low promotability task completion than previously suggested. However, 
it may also be viewed as promising that the gap is smaller among those that are meant to volunteer 






weak focal point16 as opposed to a strong focal point. In support of this possibility, Healy and Pate 
(2018) detect no gender gap in volunteering when asymmetric costs are introduced, and full 
information is provided to participants. It is possible that this provided a stronger focal point as 
there is no uncertainty about if any group contains a low cost member.  
 We find promising results with regards to requests to complete low promotability tasks. 
The introduction of explicit opportunity cost differences removes any gender difference in request 
received, and as a result, in overall completion of low promotability tasks. However, in moving 
from treatment 2 to treatment 3, we inadvertently changed two variables at once. Beyond the 
addition of managers, we also unintentionally provided subjects with information about the 
distribution of costs within their group prior to make volunteering decisions. Consistent with the 
results of Healy and Pate (2018), it is possible that the change in information rather than the 
equitable assignment of requests is what produced the lack of gender gap in volunteering. Yet, 
even so, the result that there is no gender gap in requests in the presence of asymmetric costs is 
robust. Future work will include an intermediate version of treatment 2 in which information is 
provided about each of the group member’s costs.  
  Our work provided mixed results on the effect of explicit cost differences on the 
previously observed gender gap in volunteering to complete low-promotability tasks.  On the other 
hand, we find evidence that the introduction of explicit cost differences alleviates the previously 
observed gender gap in low promotability task completion. Taken together, our results suggest that 
it may be the case that gender norms create a weak focal point in the absence of a stronger signal. 
In the presence of incomplete information about the costs of other group members, there is only a 
weak individual level focal point on who ought to volunteer. On the other hand, when that 
                                                 






information is made explicit to managers, a strong focal point is introduced that overpowers the 
one created by gender norms. However, to be certain of this possibility future work including an 
intermediate version of treatment 2 in which information is provided about each of the group 

























5. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 My dissertation presents three projects which study the effect of identity on individual 
preferences and behavior. Each work contains results that illustrate that identity effects how 
individuals behave in situations that affect themselves as well as situations that affect others.  
The essays study the effect of general group membership as well as the effect of real social 
groups and their associated behavioral prescriptions. My work shows that identity is relevant and 
should be considered in the pursuit of understanding individual heterogeneity in preferences and 
behavior.  
 In section 2, we study the ways in which one identity can moderate the effect of another 
identity on behavior. In particular, we investigate how cultural norms effect the often observed 
gender gap in competitive preferences. We do so by repeating the procedure of Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) in which subject perform a simple addition task under both a piece rate and 
competitive payment scheme and then have the opportunity to select which payment scheme 
they would prefer to have applied to a third performance. Although the original study finds that 
men are close to twice as likely to pick the competitive payment scheme even though there are 
no differences in performance, we find a stark contrast within the two populations we studied. In 
the Hispanic sample which we believe to have cultural norms similar to the original study, we 
find a gender gap that is similar to the original study. However, in the black sample which we 
hypothesized has more egalitarian gender norms, we find no gender gap in competitive 
preferences.  
 The results of this section suggest that social norms affect individual behavior. Beyond 
this, our results provide clear evidence that nurture plays a significant role in the expression of 






samples. Given other’s work showing that competitive preference predict occupational choice 
(Buser et al., 2012), our work suggests that policymakers should invest in campaigns that aim to 
shift norms regarding female competitiveness. 
 My third section turns to studying group behavior more generally by investigating the 
mechanism underlying in-group bias in trust. Adapting the design introduced by Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004), we are able to isolate the ways in which a trusting decision differs from a 
similarly risky decision and how identity effects these considerations.   Our results indicate that 
individuals are not concerned with relative earnings when matched with either members of their 
in-group or out-group. On the other hand, we do find that subjects are wary to risk a betrayal 
with either their in-group or out-group by not having trust reciprocated. However, we find this 
effect is much stronger when paired with members of another group producing the previously 
observed in-group bias in trust.  
 Our results add to our understanding of intergroup behavior. Social identification which 
sorts individuals into different groups leads to discrimination and conflict which are costly from 
an economic perspective. Our results shed light on the mechanism underlying this behavior and 
suggest that greater intergroup cooperation may be achieved in the presence of institutions which 
shield individuals from learning of betrayals.  
 In my final work, I return to the study the influence of gender identity but do so in a 
social context. Babcock et al. (2017) provide evidence of a gender gap in low promotability task 
completion and suggest that this may be a primary cause of the persistence of vertical 
segregation across genders. We build on this work by testing the importance of gender norms in 






hypothesized that gender norms may provide a weak focal point in the absence of a stronger 
signal of who ought to volunteer to complete low promotability tasks.      
 Our results provide mixed confirmation of our hypothesis. We fail to replicate the 
original results but find a gap similar to the original study when asymmetric costs are introduced. 
We find that the effect of explicit costs differences varies across cost type with low cost 
individuals exhibiting a smaller gender gap in volunteering than their high cost counterparts. On 
other hand, we find robust evidence that there is no gender gap in requests received to volunteer 
when asymmetric costs are introduced. We believe that this is driven by the cost difference 
providing a stronger focal point that the weak one provided by gender norms. Although it is 
unclear how making cost differences salient to subjects affects volunteering behavior, our results 
suggest that making managers aware of other responsibilities of their workers may help to 
alleviate the empirically observed gender gap in low-promotability task completion. 
 The work contained within this dissertation provides consistent evidence that individuals 
are affected by their identity. Individuals recognize and conform to the behavioral prescriptions 
of the groups to which they belong even when it is costly to do so. Although social norms are 
difficult to shift, we should all be wary of the subtle but powerful effects they can have on 
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Table A-1: Eckel-Grossman Task 
Gamble Payment A Payment B 
1 $10.00 $10.00 
2 $14.00 $8.00 
3 $18.00 $6.00 
4 $22.00 $4.00 
5 $26.00 $2.00 
6 $30.00 $0.00 
 
 
Table A-2: Survey Questions 
1. What is your gender? 
2. How old are you? 
3. What is your level of studies? 
4. Are you a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics) major? 
5. Are you a member of the ROTC or Corp of Cadets? 
6. What is the religion with which you most identify? 
7. How important would you say religion is to you? 
8. What is the ethnic group with which you most identify?  
9. How important would you say your ethnicity is to you? 






11. If so, what is your level of participation? 
12. Have you ever attended a single sex institution (grade school, middle school, high school, or 
college) for at least a year? 
 
13. Did you move to the U.S. before the age of five? 
14. How many bathrooms were in your childhood home? 
15. Which of the following best describes the neighborhood you grew up in? 
16. Were you raised in a household with both parents? 
17. Who was the primary decision in your household growing up? 
18.  What is the highest level of education your father ever completed? 
19. How many males (not including yourself) were in your childhood home? 
20. How many females (not including yourself) were in your childhood home?  
21. Which category best describes your age relative to your siblings? 
For the following question, please use a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 means you are ''completely 
unwilling to take risks'' and a 6 means you are ''very willing to take risks.'' 
 
22. How do you see yourself; are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks? 
 
For the following question, please use a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means you are ''lowest relative 
to most students'' and a 10 means you are ''highest relative to most students.'' 
 
23. How intelligent are you relative to the other members of your university? 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how much, you as an individual, agree or 
disagree, with the following statements. 
 
24. I have little control over things that happen to me. 
25. I can do just about anything I really set my mind to. 
26. I am able to do things as well as most people. 
27. Am exacting in my work. 






29. Don't like to draw attention to myself. 
30. Don't mind being the center of attention 
31. Have you ever been unfairly discouraged by a teacher or advisor from continuing your 
education. 
 
32. People have acted as if they think you are not smart. 
33. A working wife feels more useful than one who doesn't hold a job. 
34. Girls and boys should be treated the same in school. 
35. Competing with boys in school would make a girl unpopular with boys. 
36. If there is not enough money for all the children to go to college the boys should get to go 
instead of the girls.  
 
Table A-3: Repeated Probit Analysis of Task 3 Competition Entry with Beliefs about 































Table A-6: Repeated Probit Analysis of Task 3 Competition Entry with Beliefs about  





























Table A-9: Repeated Probit Analysis of Task 4 Competition Entry with Beliefs about 
Relative Performance and Black A&M Dummies 
 
 
 
